Louisiana State University Law Center

LSU Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the
Trees
Blake Hudson
Louisiana State University Law Center, blake.hudson@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Hudson, Blake, "Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees" (2011). Journal
Articles. 157.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/157

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF

COLORADO LAW REVIEW
Volume 82, Issue 2

2011

CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, AND
FEDERALISM: SEEING THE TREATY FOR
THE TREES
BLAKE HUDSON ∗
Despite numerous attempts over the past two decades—
including, most recently, the Copenhagen climate discussions in late 2009—international forest and climate negotiations have failed to produce a legally binding treaty addressing global forest management activities. This failure is due
in large part to a lack of U.S. leadership. Though U.S. participation in ongoing forest and climate negotiations is essential, scholars have not fully explored the potential limiting
effects of federalism on the United States’ treaty power in the
area of forest management. Such an exploration is necessary
given the debate among constitutional law scholars regarding the scope of the treaty power, the United States’ history of
invoking federalism to inhibit treaty formation and participation, and the constitutional reservation of primary land
use regulatory authority for state and local governments.
This Article argues that due to great uncertainty surrounding the question of whether federalism limits the federal government’s ability to enter into and implement a legally bind∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, Gulfport, Florida. For their comments and insights, I wish to thank Curtis Bradley, James
Salzman, Jonathan Wiener, Ben Cashore, Erika Weinthal, Brigham Daniels,
Mike Allen, Lou Virelli, Jeff Minneti, and Troy Rule, although they are not responsible for any of the conclusions drawn in this article. I thank the Global Institute of Sustainable Forestry at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental
Studies for allowing me to present the arguments put forth in this article as part
of the Yale Forest Forum Leadership Seminar. I also thank Duke University
School of Law and Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment for allowing me to present this article and receive valuable insights provided by the faculty. Finally, I thank the excellent editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for their wonderful suggestions, edits and effort. I dedicate this article to my
grandparents, George and Gladys Campbell, without whom I would never have
developed my love for forests, as well as to my parents, Lamar and Latona Hudson, who nurtured that love and provided me the opportunity to pursue my goals.
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ing treaty directly regulating forest management activities
via prescriptive mechanisms, any binding treaty aimed at forests should include voluntary, market-based mechanisms—
like REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs—to facilitate U.S. participation and avoid
challenges to treaty implementation in the United States.

Fig. 1: Forest clearcut with forested buffer zone along watershed 1

INTRODUCTION
Nations with federal systems should consider the compatibility of treaties with their constitutional orders before concluding them, because any errors are almost certainly
not a basis for extricating themselves afterward. . . . International Law obliges nations to explore the limits of their
constitutional structure to comply with treaties. 2

Recently, I visited a parcel of private forestland in Alabama. I walked down a hill to a creek that runs through an
impressive stand of oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines. The
1. ALA. FORESTRY COMM’N, ALABAMA’S BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR
FORESTRY 4 (2007), available at http://www.forestry.state.al.us/Publications/
BMPs/2007_BMP_Manual.pdf [hereinafter ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES].
2. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 403, 456, 492 (2003).
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creek happens to establish the property line shared with the
adjacent landowner. Upon reaching the bottom of the hill I observed that the forest that once stretched across the creek now
stopped at the creek. The adjacent landowner had recently
clear-cut the property and had removed the timber all the way
to the water line on the opposite bank. This Alabama forester’s
action was clearly contrary to the state of Alabama’s suggested
Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) for forests, which state
that a forested buffer zone should be left along watersheds to
“[p]rotect banks, beds, and floodplains from erosion; control direct deposition of pollutants; provide shade, food, and cover for
aquatic ecosystems; [and] filter out pollutants from uplands.” 3
Though private forest management regulation, and land use
regulation generally, have long been the purview of state and
local regulatory authority in the United States, 4 federal and international regulatory bodies have taken a growing interest in
forest management decisions of the kind made by this Alabama
forester. 5
The international community has increasingly focused on
global standardization of forest management practices for numerous reasons—based on both environmental and economic
concerns. Preventing poor forest management decisions not only protects local environmental goods and services, like clean
water and biodiversity, but also provides global goods in the
3. ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 5. The state of Alabama
delegates authority to the Alabama Forestry Commission to develop BMPs for the
management of forests in watersheds. Title 9, section 10A-4 of the Code of Alabama establishes guidelines for protecting forested watersheds and states that
“[a]ny management guidelines developed by watershed management authorities
to protect forested watersheds shall follow the best management practices established by the Alabama forestry commission as they pertain to forested watersheds.” ALA. CODE § 9-10A-4 (2010). Alabama’s BMPs include provisions for
“streamside management zones” (“SMZs”), which are to be harvested for forest
products in such a way “as to protect the forest floor and under story vegetation
from damage.” ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 4. The minimum
standards state that SMZs should be established no less than thirty-five feet from
a “definable bank,” and within the SMZ only partial harvesting of trees is appropriate. Id. at 5. This partial harvesting should leave a minimum residual forest
cover of no less than 50% “crown cover.” Id. “Crown” is defined as: “The top of a
tree consisting of trunk and expanding branches.” Id. at 24.
4. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government
has limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the
states. Forestland management and use was one such reserved power.” Gerald
A. Rose with Douglas W. MacCleery et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in
the US, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer &
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005).
5. See also infra notes 11, 16.
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form of carbon sequestration, as governments seek to battle the
effects of climate change by including forest carbon in the evergrowing carbon credit market. 6 The global benefits of preventing poor forest management at local scales are enormous, as a
vast majority of the 20 to 25 percent of annual global carbon
emissions resulting from forest and land use activities are attributable to forest destruction and degradation—more carbon
than is emitted by the transportation sector each year. 7 Even
so, efforts over the past twenty years to address national and
local forest management activities and harmonize forest practices within a legally binding international treaty have failed.
This failure is due in large part to the United States’ unwillingness to support such an agreement, even though policymakers and scholars view U.S. participation as crucial to the success of any global environmental treaty. 8
Regardless of past failures, national governments continue
to discuss approaches to achieving responsible global forest
management.
The United Nations Forum on Forests
(“UNFF”) 9 remains the primary forum for “stand-alone” forest
treaty negotiations, 10 which aim to promote sustainable forestry, preserve the numerous ecosystem services provided by forests, and address climate change. In addition, because forest
carbon sequestration provides a powerful tool for tackling climate change, national governments are increasingly seeking to
incorporate global forest management into a post-Kyoto climate
treaty. 11 Such a treaty has yet to materialize since the fif6. See Erin C. Myers, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD) in Tropical Forests: An Examination of the Issues Facing the
Incorporation of REDD into Market-Based Climate Policies 4 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper 07-50, 2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFFDP-07-50.pdf. For further information on the process of carbon sequestration, see
Kenneth L. Denman et al., 7: Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System
and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 499, 512 (Susan Salomon
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/
ar4-wg1-chapter7.pdf [hereinafter IPCC].
7. Myers, supra note 6, at 4.
8. See infra Part II.B; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
9. The UNFF concluded its eighth session in May 2009 (“UNFF-8”). See
UNFF8 Voluntary Reports, UNITED NATIONS F. ON FORESTS, http://www.un.org/
esa/forests/reports-unff8.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
10. By “stand-alone” this Article refers to negotiations that are outside the
context of climate treaty negotiations.
11. A number of scholars have noted this trend. See, e.g., A. Angelsen, REDD
Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); T. Johns et al., A
Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private Forest
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teenth United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”) took place in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.
Even so, national governments continue to develop both regulatory and market-based solutions to address climate change.12
The U.S. Congress, for example, has considered numerous bills
proposing a carbon cap-and-trade scheme for regulating industrial carbon emissions, 13 and various state governments have
Stewards Into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458 (2008);
A. Karsenty et al., Summary of the Proceedings of the International Workshop
“The International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and
Private Policies Towards Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd
November 2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 424 (2008); K. Levin, C. McDermott, &
B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a
‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538 (2008).
At the Bali round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in December 2007, the parties agreed to initiate a
plan, which was intended to be finalized at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference 2009 (“COP-15”) in Copenhagen, that would lead to the development
of “next steps” for countries to take to address climate change. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-605, CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERT OPINION ON
THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 16–17 (2008),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (“UN-DESA”) described the Bali talks as
placing “greater attention [on forests] in climate change deliberations not only because of their role in mitigating and adapting to climate change, but also due to
growing concerns over carbon emissions, resulting from deforestation and forest
degradation in developing countries where emissions are considerable and increasing.” U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, Forests: the Green and REDD of Climate Change 2 (2009), http://www.un.org/
esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief16.pdf. Furthermore, at UNFF-8 in April 2009,
many called for both forest carbon and non-carbon values to be addressed within
any future climate agreement. UNFF8 Discusses Role of Forests in Future Climate Change Regime, CLIMATE-L.ORG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://climate-l.org/
2009/04/23/unff8-discusses-role-of-forests-in-future-climate-change-regime
(also
see referenced press releases). Also in April 2009, the UN-DESA issued a policy
brief asserting that “[t]he global climate change agreement should include actions
on deforestation and forest degradation within the wider context of sustainable
forest management.” U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN-DESA Policy Brief
No. 15, Finance for Forests and Climate Change (2009), http://www.un.org/
esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief15.pdf. More explicitly, UN-DESA advocated
that “[a]t Copenhagen in December 2009, it is crucial that countries agree to include reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a post-2012
climate regime.” UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, supra at 4.
12. For example, the European Union Emission Trading System was
launched in 2005. EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE:
EU EMISSIONS TRADING—AN OPEN SCHEME PROMOTING GLOBAL INNOVATION 3
(2005) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review). See also Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN COMM’N CLIMATE ACTION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 11, 2010).
13. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong.;
Dingell-Boucher Draft Legislation of 2008, see Dingell-Boucher Cap-and-Trade
Bill,
INST.
FOR
ENERGY
RESEARCH
(Oct.
7,
2008),
http://
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already begun to participate in similar schemes. 14 Proposed
legislation at both the federal and state levels has explicitly
provided a substantial role for forests in mitigating U.S. carbon
emissions. 15
If either a stand-alone forest treaty or a climate treaty incorporating forest management were to arise in the near future, a natural question would be: How would such a treaty affect federal and state forest management regulation in the
United States? A more salient question, however, would be the
inverse: How does the relationship between federal and state
regulatory authority in the United States affect stand-alone
forest or climate treaty negotiations? More specifically, how
does U.S. federalism complicate the United States’ role in forest management treaty formation given that the federal government is granted authority under the Constitution to negowww.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-tradebill/; American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(Waxman-Markey Bill). Regarding the potential role of forests in such programs,
scholars have noted:
The international forest carbon provisions in the Lieberman-Werner
America Climate Security Act (S.2191), [previously] under debate in the
U.S. Senate, . . . allocates funds from allowance revenues to implement
and develop [reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation]
activities but remains somewhat flexible on whether any credits generated by that activity could ultimately end up as credits usable in the U.S.
compliance market.
Brian Murray & Lydia Olander, Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Short
Policy Brief, A Core Participation Requirement for Creation of a REDD Market 1–2
(2008), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/a-coreparticipation-requirement-for-creation-of-a-redd-market (follow “policy brief
(.pdf)” hyperlink).
14. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Accord (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Canadian
province of Manitoba), and the Western Climate Initiative (Arizona, California,
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and the Canadian provinces of
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec). See North American Cap-andTrade Initiatives, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/NA-capandtrade (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
15. Scholars have noted that “proposed legislation in the United States (at
both the federal and subnational level) contained significant provisions on REDD
and international forest carbon management.” JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN
& MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1203 (2d ed. 2009).
See also William Boyd, Deforestation and Emerging Greenhouse Gas Compliance
Regimes: Toward a Global Environmental Law of Forests, Carbon and Climate
Governance, in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING CARBON
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION 1, 9–13 (Valentina
Bosetti & Ruben Lubowski eds., 2010).
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tiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary land
use regulatory authority for activities like private forest management?
This Article expands a policy analysis recently published
by the author and Professor Erika Weinthal, summarizing the
political science theory in the field of global forest regime formation and suggesting policy mechanisms for avoiding the consequences of potential federalism-based complications. 16 This
Article further develops and explores the legal bases for, and
implications of, U.S. federalism’s potential limiting effect on
the treaty power in the area of global forest management.
Such an exploration is important as a vigorous debate continues among constitutional law scholars regarding the scope of
the treaty-making power established in Article II of the U.S.
Constitution. As discussed below, many scholars argue that, in
light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 17 reasserting federalism constraints on the federal government’s power (i.e., the
“new federalism” 18), federalism acts as a restraint on the United States’ ability to implement international treaties requiring
the passage of federal legislation that would not, standing
alone, pass constitutional muster. 19 Direct federal regulation
of private forest management would be just the type of congressional legislation that new federalists would argue is unconstitutional, given that states maintain primary regulatory
authority over land use. 20 Other scholars, supporting the “nationalist” perspective, assert that the treaty power is not so limited. They argue that if implemented pursuant to an international treaty, the federal government may assert regulatory
16. Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees:
How U.S. Federalism can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT.
RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 353 (2009).
17. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
18. Swaine, supra note 2, at 403.
19. See id.; see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism (pts. 1 & 2), 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley I], 99
MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley II]; Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing
the Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities That Don’t
“Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing the Realities of the New
Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167 (2004); Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
1327 (2006); Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1867 (2005).
20. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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authority over subject matters—even those traditionally regulated by state governments—that it would be unable to regulate in the absence of a treaty. 21
It is unlikely that the debate over whether federalism
places limits on the United States’ treaty-making power will be
resolved anytime soon. 22 Given the United States’ record of allowing federalism to inhibit its participation in international
treaties in the past, 23 however, it is crucial to explore questions
regarding U.S. federalism’s potential effect on international
forest negotiations. This Article argues that due to the uncer21. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075,
1258 (2000). Professor Hollis succinctly detailed the two camps that have
emerged regarding the scope of the treaty power:
In one camp lie the reigning “nationalists.” Nationalists contend that
the Supreme Court definitively, and correctly, resolved the question of
federalism constraints on the treaty power in Missouri v. Holland. The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
encapsulates this view, relying on Missouri for the proposition that “the
Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or
other agreements.” Nationalists thus reject the idea that federalism imposes subject matter limitations on the conclusion or implementation of
treaties, even for subjects Congress could not otherwise regulate in the
treaty’s absence.
In the other camp reside the rebellious “new federalists.” New federalists reject the orthodoxy’s view of Missouri in light of: (1) the Supreme
Court’s renewed willingness to protect states’ rights under the banner of
federalism; and (2) the expansion of treaty-making to include new procedures and subjects previously thought to be of distinctly local concern.
New federalists contend that the Court could, or should, restrict the subjects the United States may regulate by treaty—or Congress’s ability to
implement them—to accord with existing limits on Congress’s enumerated powers. They also support imposing other federalism-based restrictions, such as the anticommandeering principle, to restrain the processes
by which the federal government imposes treaty obligations on the
states. Thus, new federalists suggest the Supreme Court should read
Missouri more narrowly or overrule it entirely.
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1330–31 (citations omitted).
22. As an example of how deep the rift between the two camps runs, Hollis
noted:
To support their textual and structural conclusions, both nationalists
and new federalists turn to history. . . . [N]ationalists claim that the
Framers did not envision constitutional limitations for treaties . . . .
New federalists review the same materials and reach the opposite conclusion. . . . Beyond the Founding materials, both sides present subsequent historical evidence to bolster—or undermine—their respective interpretations. Often they rely on the same source.
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1340–42.
23. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.

2011]

CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, & FEDERALISM

371

tainty surrounding the scope of the treaty power, and because
federalism may limit federal regulatory authority over land use
activities like private forest management, for any international
forest treaty to succeed at the national and subnational levels—and thus promote the protection of carbon, ecosystem service, and other sustainable management values of forests—the
United States will need to go to the bargaining table promoting
voluntary, market-based programs that allow its private forest
owners to voluntarily participate in the federal program. The
incorporation of market-based mechanisms—such as reduction
of emissions from deforestation and degradation (“REDD”), forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs 24—into an international treaty would both avoid failure
of treaty implementation in the United States, as well as potentially spur treaty creation in the first instance given the
United States’ crucial role in international environmental treaty formation. 25 Because market-based mechanisms, unlike
prescriptive dictates, allow private forest owners to participate
in the federal program on a voluntary basis, they do not require
the federal government to directly regulate private lands—a
role traditionally reserved for state governments under the
U.S. federal system. 26 Thus, market-based mechanisms would
avoid the federalism complications of direct federal prescriptive
regulation of private forestlands, and the United States could
successfully implement the treaty domestically. 27
The aim of this Article is to employ legal analysis and policy assessment to demonstrate how to best reconcile U.S. fede24. See infra note 173.
25. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
26. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354. This is not to say that the
United States is the only federal country that might face issues of domestic implementation as described in this Article. Analysis of those systems, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article. For example, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867
grants the provincial governments exclusive responsibility for forest management.
Constitution Act § 92(5), 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
app. II, no. 5 (Can.). In fact, scholars have noted that the 1982 amendments to
Canada’s Constitution placed it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily
responsible for forest management.”
DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW:
RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 133 (2003). It should
be noted, however, that under the Canadian Constitution the federal government
does retain the role of participating in international negotiations “related to the
conservation and use of forests.” Id. at 132.
27. An assessment of the viability of these programs in achieving the benefits
they purport to provide is beyond the scope of this Article. As the citations in this
Article indicate, however, numerous scholars believe these programs to be an effective policy response to protect forests globally.
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ralism with the treaty power and global governance of forests.
Part I details the current state of international forest governance negotiations and briefly summarizes how climate change
provides an impetus to remedy past failures to achieve binding
global governance of forests. Part II describes and explains
how the United States, though integral to the success of any international treaty on forests, maintains a potential federalismbased veto power, and how treaty negotiators may avoid this
potential impediment to forest treaty formation. Part III
summarizes the current state of debate on potential federalism
constraints on the treaty power, including an examination of
the seminal treaty power case of Missouri v. Holland, 28 and
concludes that the debate raises serious questions about
whether the United States federal government may directly regulate certain private land uses, such as forest management,
despite entering into a binding international treaty for the
management and protection of forests. The Article concludes
that due to the uncertainty over federalism’s potential limiting
effects on the treaty power, market-based, voluntary mechanisms could pave the way for the U.S. to enter into, and implement, a global treaty aimed at forest management, notwithstanding the continued debate on federalism and the scope of
the treaty power.
I.

CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN A BINDING GLOBAL TREATY

Though global forest management treaty discussions have
repeatedly met difficulties over the past two decades, increasing concern over climate change has reopened the door for
coordinated international action on forests. Potential government action on climate change raises many questions for private forest owners in the United States. Would a nation-wide
climate change scheme enacted pursuant to a global treaty
open up the carbon market beyond U.S. borders, giving forest
owners crucial incentives provided by access to the worldwide
carbon market? Could the Alabama forester noted above be
persuaded to leave the forest intact under such a scheme if
economically valuable carbon credits were made available or if
paid by industrial polluters seeking to offset emissions? If so,
these carbon incentives would have the effect not only of pre28.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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serving carbon values but also of promoting sustainable forestry and protecting numerous other goods and services provided by forests.
Climate change has also altered the governmental level at
which localized private forest management activities are scrutinized. For example, at what scale are sustainable private
forest owner directives or incentives most appropriately implemented—at the state, federal, or international level? Which
entities are best situated to design forest management directives that will capture the full environmental and economic
value of the resource—local communities and state governments, which have on-the-ground access to the best information and are able to more efficiently allocate resources? National and international governmental entities, which can more
readily account for forest values beyond local scales? Or perhaps private bodies, which maintain an increasing stake in
how local forest resources are managed?
These considerations and questions exemplify the increasingly complex nature of modern forest management, especially
given the role of forests in climate change. A forested watershed in rural Alabama demonstrates how private individuals, subject to state regulations, could potentially interact in a
federal regulatory scheme that might arise out of global treaty
negotiations. In reality, the Alabama forest I visited stretched
far beyond the opposite creek bank and actually extended
around the world, as forest managers are increasingly considering forests’ potential to provide not only local communities, but
also the global community, with a wealth of ecosystem and
economic resources—not the least of which is a substantial
means of fighting climate change. 29
Indeed, international harmonization of forest management
practices has occupied an increasingly important place on the
world stage during the last twenty years. Since the late 1980s,
countries promoting formal global action on forest practices
have made numerous attempts to forge a legally binding international forest treaty but repeatedly have been denied. Various international fora have considered the creation of such a
treaty: the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (“UNCED”) in Rio de Janeiro; four proceedings of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (“IPF”) between 1995
and 1997; four proceedings of the Intergovernmental Forum on
29.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Forests (“IFF”) between 1997 and 2000; and most recently numerous proceedings of the UNFF in the 2000s. 30 None of these
negotiations resulted in a treaty, and some scholars have described forest treaty discussions as “a resounding failure.” 31
Though scholars have suggested a variety of reasons for these
failures, 32 as discussed further in Part II.B below, one of the
30. Radoslav S. Dimitrov et al., International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2006); see also S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards
the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 550, 552
(2008); Deborah S. Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the
International Arrangement on Forests: UNFF-5, -6, and -7, 15 REV. OF EUR. CMTY.
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 316 (2006). Davenport and Wood describe the chronology of
discussions over a forest treaty since 1992 as follows:
International forest policy negotiations have often been characterized by
political entrenchment . . . . Since the failure at the 1992 [UNCED] in
Rio de Janeiro to achieve a legally binding forest convention, several fora
have been developed in order to allow international forest policy discussions to continue . . . . [But a] convention speci
ﬁcally addressing forests
eluded consensus. . . . [T]he [IPF] was established as an expert body under the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), with a 2year work programme intended to combat deforestation and forest degradation. The IPF . . . led to the creation of the [IFF] in 1997 . . . . The
UNFF was then formed, with a plan of action that centered on implementation of the IPF/IFF proposals for action. . . . [T]he creation of the
UNFF had less to do with monitoring the implementation of the proposals for action than it had to do with compromise: the need to counter the
disappointment of some at the lack of an agreement to negotiate a forest
convention with the creation of a new, more permanent forum with a
substantially higher level of political authority.
Id. at 316–17.
31. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental
Regime Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 134 (2003). Though some describe
these efforts as a failure, later rounds of the UNFF have at least shown increased
attention to the issue of a binding treaty. One scholar noted that “[t]he negotiations for [a non-legally binding instrument] that took place at UNFF-7 followed on
from a . . . decision negotiated at UNFF-5 and UNFF-6 and represent[s] a compromise between pro-convention and anti-convention forces.” Deborah S. Davenport, UNFF-7: The Way Forward, 37 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY ASS’N NEWSL.
6–7 (2007).
32. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 353–54 (“At UNCED conflicts
erupted over trade issues between developed and developing countries, stifling
agreement on a ‘new legal instrument on forests.’ Both at UNCED and subsequent forest conferences, progress has been stymied by developing countries concerned that a binding treaty would negatively affect developing economies by regulating tropical forests more stringently than the temperate and boreal forests of
the developed world. As the use of market-based mechanisms to address global
forest issues has become more popular, this concern has morphed into a fear of
‘forest colonialism,’ whereby the developed world would pay for the right to continue emitting carbon into the atmosphere while at the same time limiting development of forested lands in the developing world.”) (citations omitted). See also
Dimitrov, supra note 31, at 135; TOM GRIFFITHS, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME,
SEEING ‘RED’?: ‘AVOIDED DEFORESTATION’ AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
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most significant impediments to treaty formation has been the
United States’ inability to consistently support a legally binding international forest management agreement. 33 The following Sections A and B introduce the primary international forums that have considered harmonization of forest
management practices via international treaty. Section C
briefly discusses the inertia toward utilizing climate change as
a vehicle for addressing forest management globally.
A.

The United Nations Forum on Forests

The primary forum facilitating debate on global governance of forests is the UNFF. The UNFF promotes sustainable
forestry, solutions to climate change, and preservation of the
varied ecosystem services provided by global forests. 34 As
noted above, however, international negotiations leading up to
the current UNFF talks have failed to achieve binding global
forest governance. The Rio rounds of forest talks in 1992 only
produced a non-binding statement of principles. 35 A binding
forest treaty was never even placed on the negotiation agenda
because the G-77 group of developing countries largely viewed
a treaty as a means for the developed world to raise trade barriers. 36 Furthermore, the G-77 believed developed countries
were pressuring them to take economically detrimental “action
to protect tropical forests while” at the same time refusing to
enforce the same regulations on temperate and boreal forests. 37

PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2007), available at http://www.
forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/avoided_deforestation_red_jun07_eng.pdf.
33. See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of
the UNCED Forest Negotiations, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 105, 105; see
also Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2005, at 1, 9–10.
34. Such ecosystem services include enhancing managed forests’ role in watershed protection and flood control; protecting habitat, biodiversity, and genetic
resources; and preserving cultural and recreational values. See Bastiaan Louman
et al., 1: Forest Ecosystem Services: A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in INT’L
UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 16–20 (Risto Seppälä, Alexander Buck, & Pia Katila eds., 2009), available at http://www.iufro.org/science/
gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (follow “Download chapter 1” hyperlink).
35. Dimitrov, supra note 31, at 135.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Subsequent IPF, IFF, and UNFF discussions stagnated over
similar issues. 38
A key reason for the failure to achieve a stand-alone treaty
is the United States’ retraction of its support for a legally binding international agreement on forest management. 39 As discussed in greater detail below, numerous scholars have cited
the United States as the most influential country in the international environmental governance system, and the United
States was actually the first country to propose a stand-alone,
binding forest convention. 40 Although the United States was
unable to push through a binding agreement in the early
1990s, its official reversal of support for binding international
forest management in 1997 has made it more difficult for the
international community to revisit the issue. 41 The United
States’ reversal represented a domestic political shift that embraced the argument put forth by developing countries opposed
to a binding treaty—that national sovereignty in the forest sector is more valuable than benefits derived from an international forest treaty. 42
Despite U.S. recalcitrance in past stand-alone forest negotiations, the 2007 UNFF talks showed signs of progress, resulting in a “Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests.” 43 This instrument was meant to promote sustainable
forest management worldwide by encouraging national action
and international cooperation. 44 Though the Statement was a
positive step forward, some scholars claim that the instrument
“looks unlikely to achieve any real consolidation of global forest
governance,” 45 while others note that the failure to achieve a

Id. at 136–37.
See Dimitrov, supra note 33, at 10.
Davenport, supra note 33, at 105.
Id. at 126–37.
See Imme Scholz, A Forest Convention—Yes or No?, GER. DEV. INST. (DIE)
DISCUSSION PAPERS 15 (2004), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C70602
33&lng=en&id=27768 (follow “English PDF” hyperlink).
43. G.A. Res. 62/98, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/98, at 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/14717-03d86aa8c1a7426cf69bf9e2f5023bb
12.pdf.
44. U.N. Forum on Forests, Rep. of the 7th Sess., Feb. 24, 2006–Apr. 27, 2007,
U.N. Doc. E/2007/42 (2007).
45. Guéneau & Tozzi, supra note 30, at 551.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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legally binding stand-alone forest agreement “remains a setback.” 46
B.

The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change

The other major forum considering global governance of
forests is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which also previously failed to
create a binding instrument establishing a significant role for
forests in mitigating atmospheric carbon levels. 47 The current
leading UNFCCC treaty on climate change, the Kyoto Protocol
(adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005), is a multilateral environmental agreement assigning binding carbon reduction targets and timetables to “Annex I,” or industrialized
nations, as well as general commitments for all member countries. 48 The protocol, however, has largely ignored forest management as a means of achieving carbon sequestration goals, as
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation have not
been integrated into Kyoto targets. 49 Rather, the protocol’s effectiveness has been measured primarily with reference to its
direct regulation of industry emitters to achieve a reduction of
greenhouse gases. 50
46. Katharina Kunzmann, The Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Management of All Types of Forests - Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest Management?, 9 GER. L.J. 981, 1005 (2008), available at http://www.
germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No08/PDF_Vol_09_No_08_981-1006_Articles_
Kunzmann.pdf (“The value of this Instrument lies in the advantage that it ties
together the most important rules and standards of forest policy in one document
and that it aims to realise sustainable forest management instead of limiting itself to a mere repetition of the global objectives of forests. The Instrument, however, does not succeed in creating one comprehensive set of all rules applicable
and desirable for the forest sector, nor does it in fact reflect each state’s responsibility to ensure the sustainable management of its forests. Furthermore, the fact
that no consent could be reached on a legally binding instrument remains a setback.”).
47. For discussion of Kyoto’s failure to adequately incorporate forest management, see Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 544. See generally
Benjamin Cashore, Constance McDermott & Kelly Levin, The Shaping and Reshaping of British Columbia Forest Policy in the Global Era: A Review of Governmental and Non-governmental Strategic Initiatives (2006), available at http://
www.yale.edu/forestcertification/pdfs/ABCFP.pdf.
48. See Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 543–45.
49. Id. at 544.
50. Though the Kyoto Protocol introduced the Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”) for forest carbon offset projects in developing countries, the CDM option
for forests has remained largely unutilized, as only eight forest CDMs exist. See
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Cashore, McDermott, and Levin find that while private
entities, environmental groups, and government agencies have
been included in talks to address climate change, forest managers often have not. 51 Even though 20 to 25 percent of annual
global carbon emissions result from forest and land use activities, and a vast majority of these emissions are attributable to
forest destruction and degradation, 52 forest managers “have
not been required to act strategically in mitigating emissions or
adapting to climate change impacts” and “[e]nvironmental
groups . . . have yet to target their campaigns upon unsustainable forest management [and] the lack of adaptation strategies
among forest managers.” 53
C.

Climate Change as an Impetus to Remedy Past
Failures

Despite previous failures to comprehensively integrate forest carbon sequestration into either stand-alone or climate
frameworks, national governments, the UNFF, and the
UNFCCC are currently guiding a global effort to capitalize on
CDM Forest Projects Approved for Uganda, Paraguay, CARBON POSITIVE (Oct. 11,
2009), http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1683.
51. Cashore, McDermott & Levin, supra note 47, at 45–46. For example, Cashore, McDermott, and Levin note that forest managers in Canada
have not . . . engaged in substantial interaction with governments and
environmental groups in regard to climate change. While there are some
government research projects on forested lands within Canada, pressure
to act on climate change has largely been placed on the industry emitters
rather than on forest managers. One plausible explanation for this discrepancy could be that the forest products industry is included in Kyoto
targets, whereas managed forests have yet to be added into national inventory numbers. Industrialized nations that are party to the Kyoto
Protocol are required to include emissions from afforestation (creation of
forests on lands that have been out of forest use for at least fifty years),
reforestation (establishment of forests on land that lacked forests in
1989), and deforestation (non-temporary removal of forests) in annual
emissions inventory reports.
However, forest management—either
through the regeneration following harvest or removal during harvest—
does not fit into any of the above categories. . . . It is, therefore, possible
that interactions among actors in regard to forest management have yet
to emerge and will do so if and only if there is a regulatory driver (in this
case, the inclusion of forest management into Kyoto emissions targets)
that creates overlapping interests.
Id.
52. Myers, supra note 6, at 4; see also IPCC, supra note 6, at 512. A small
fraction of this amount is attributed to other land use changes. Myers, supra note
6, at 4.
53. Cashore, McDermott & Levin, supra note 47, at 48.
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forests’ great potential to combat climate change 54 and to incorporate forest management activities into a post-Kyoto climate treaty. 55 In 2005, forests covered 30 percent of the total
land area worldwide. 56 Due to this vast coverage, the UNFF
has asserted that “mismanagement [of forests] would have a
significant impact on the course of global warming in the twenty-first century,” and that “[s]ustainable forest management
can contribute towards emissions reductions and to carbon sequestration.” 57 Additionally, the UNFCCC is increasingly considering using REDD programs to improve carbon credit and
offset markets globally. 58
Climate scholars have noted that forest management activities can be augmented to achieve carbon sequestration goals
through a variety of strategies, including the increase of forested land through reforestation projects, the increase in carbon density of existing forests at both stand and landscape
scales, the expanded use of forest products that sustainably replace fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions, and the implementation of programs to reduce deforestation and degradation of forests. 59 Indeed, the burgeoning currency of carbon that has exploded onto the market has made these types of management
activities more attractive and has changed the analysis regarding the viability of including global forest management programs within climate negotiations. In other words, forest carbon credits may very well help both the United States and the
international community avoid the political pitfalls that
doomed past negotiations. The Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) projected that the proposed Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act of 2007 would have resulted in U.S. carbon credit prices of between $10–$50 per metric ton of carbon
54. Karsenty et al., supra note 11, at 424–28; Johns et al., supra note 11, at
459–63; Angelsen, supra note 11, at 466–73, Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra
note 11, at 544–46.
55. See supra note 11.
56. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. N., FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147, GLOBAL
FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2005: PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
FOREST MANAGEMENT xii (2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/
a0400e/a0400e00.pdf.
57. United Nations Forum on Forests, Recent Developments in Existing Forest-Related Instruments, Agreements, and Processes 12 (U.N. Forum on Forests
Background Doc. No. 2, Working Draft, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/forests/pdf/aheg/param/background-2.pdf.
58. See infra note 171.
59. Josep G. Canadell & Michael R. Raupach, Managing Forests for Climate
Change Mitigation, 320 SCI. MAG. 1456, 1456 (2008).
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by 2012, between $18–$80 per ton by 2020, and between approximately $22–$160 per ton by 2030. 60 If such projections
come to fruition under a post-Kyoto framework, 61 global trade
in carbon provides a significant incentive for governments to
include forest management—at least as it relates to carbon sequestration values—within a binding international climate
treaty.
Importantly, global carbon trade may provide the United
States with the incentive to engage more meaningfully in climate change negotiations and to break from its past practice of
obstructing international agreements. Twenty years ago, before the United States wholly shifted its position on a global
forest treaty, it recognized the economic incentives provided by
forest carbon in mitigating the costs associated with climate
change legislation. 62 The United States is one of the world’s
largest energy users and emitters of carbon, 63 and as a result
the potential costs of carbon regulation are great. If post-Kyoto
climate negotiations harness the full potential of forests in addressing climate change and allow the United States to mitigate economic impacts via market-based REDD programs, then
the United States might come to the table more readily and be
more willing to forge an agreement. One study found that forest carbon, sequestered primarily through REDD activities,
could “cut the global cost of climate change policies in half and
reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.” 64 In fact, most iterations of proposed domestic carbon cap and trade legislation in
the United States have allowed for industry carbon offsets by
investment in, or credit purchases from, approved carbon sequestration projects—in forests or otherwise. 65 Opening up
forest markets by increasing and uniformly formalizing the
number and types of market-based programs would only in60. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REP. NO. SR-OIAF/2008-1, ENERGY MARKET
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 2191, THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY
OF
2007 Fig.5 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
servicerpt/s2191/fig5.html.
61. These projections are yet to result after COP-15 took place in Copenhagen
in December 2009.
62. See Davenport, supra note 33, at 112, 122–24. See also infra note 91 and
accompanying text.
63. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
64. Myers, supra note 6, at 25 (citing Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen & Valentina Bosetti, Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize Climate,
CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING & POL’Y WORKING PAPERS 2, 17 (Jan. 2007), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10263/1/wp070015.pdf).
65. See supra note 13.
AND
ACT
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crease the viability of U.S. participation in a global climate
treaty. Further, U.S. backing would capitalize on the aforementioned global inertia towards including managed forest
carbon within the post-Kyoto framework and would compensate for Kyoto’s failure to adequately utilize the world’s forests
to fight climate change.
Ultimately, although climate change provides a new opportunity to incorporate forest management activities within future UNFCCC and UNFF negotiations, a global treaty including forest management has yet to be achieved. Just as this
part demonstrates how including voluntary forest management
programs in climate negotiations provides incentives to the
United States to cooperate in global treaty discussions, the
next part explicates how U.S. federalism may disrupt international negotiations on binding forest management if the mechanisms for achieving forest management are prescriptive in
nature.
II. U.S. FEDERALISM AS A VETO POWER OVER GLOBAL FOREST
MANAGEMENT
While climate change provides a new opportunity for the
United States to cooperate politically with international negotiations on forest management activities, a more important
question is whether the United States maintains the legal capacity to do so. Though politics matter a great deal in global
environmental governance, without adequate legal institutions
to translate politics into policy, global treaties will not be implemented on domestic scales. It is unclear whether the United
States maintains a sufficient legal institution to implement
global forest management objectives domestically. In fact, the
United States possesses a potential veto power over any international treaty that addresses forest management, arising directly out of its domestic constitutional structure. The following sections explore the implications of this veto power, with
Section A first discussing the political science undergirding it.
Section B explains the United States’ importance to successful
global negotiations on forests, while Section C examines federalism’s potential to limit U.S. participation in those negotiations. Finally, Sections D and E analyze, respectively, the tension between international legal norms and domestic
federalism and how that tension can be avoided in the context
of U.S. participation in global forest negotiations.
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The Political Science of Forests, Federalism, and
Treaties

Recently, Professor Erika Weinthal 66 and I undertook a political science analysis of U.S. federalism’s potential effects on
global forest treaty negotiations in the event that either a legally binding stand-alone forest treaty or a post-Kyoto climate
treaty incorporating forest management emerged from future
UNFF or climate negotiations. 67 Particularly important to our
analysis were the questions of what mechanisms any treaty
aimed at forest management might employ and what requirements the treaty would impose upon participating countries.68
Weinthal and I argued that these questions are particularly
important to the United States, a nation viewed as crucial to
the success of both climate and international forest negotiations, 69 because
the US’s own domestic governance structure complicates its
role in the creation of any legally binding treaty that involves the potential direct regulation of land use by the federal government. The US’s governmental system of federalism, engrained in the US Constitution and receiving
protection by the US judiciary, causes domestic implementation of certain international forest governance scenarios to
be more viable than others. 70

66. Professor of environmental policy at the Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
67. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16.
68. Id. at 354.
69. See Davenport, supra note 33.
70. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354 (citation omitted). For a general discussion of domestic constraints in international bargaining, see Peter B.
Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics:
Reflections and Projections, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 397, 397–430 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K.
Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993). For a general comparative study of the
role of federalism in environmental regulations in the United States and Europe,
see Daniel Kelemen, Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European Union, in GREEN GIANTS? ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 113, 113–34 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G.
Faure eds., 2004).
Scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as embodying “a very limited concentration of powers in the nation’s central institutions. . . . [T]he original allocation of jurisdiction to the national government was . . . modest with the
unspecified, but apparently broad, residue being left with the states.” Ronald
Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of
Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST. 769, 769 (1987).
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Weinthal and I noted that scholars have focused on “decentralized mechanisms” for international forest governance, but
have largely ignored the effects of domestic institutional structures like federalism on international forest management treaty formation. 71 This absence is notable since some scholars argue that to achieve optimal results at the local level, any global
forest management scheme should provide the greatest amount
of flexibility in managing forests—or, a “bottom-up” apThese scholars contend that forest governance
proach. 72
should retreat from prescriptive approaches—that is, “traditional governance”—because “traditional governance, focusing
on a hierarchical, top-down style of policy formulation and implementation of the nation state and the use of regulatory policy instruments, will be incompatible with this demand for flexibility.” 73
Importantly, international negotiations have acted as a limitation on the role of traditional governance for forests by
making more difficult the use of prescriptive regulation. 74 The
success of international forest negotiations no longer depends
upon top-down, regulatory mandates alone. Rather, negotiations depend upon the participation of numerous private and
public entities, the promotion of flexibility to allow local goThough the balance of power between the state and federal governments shifts
periodically in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence—thus leading to court “protection” of states’ rights to a greater or lesser degree than federal power—the judicial
system resolutely protects the principle that is U.S. federalism. As Watts noted,
“[i]n the United States there have been fluctuations in the relative strengths of
the national and state governments.” Id. at 773. It remains, however, that “the
courts and particularly the Supreme Court have come to play a prominent role
through their exercise of judicial review to ensure the constitutionality of legislation and executive and administrative action relating to . . . the distribution of jurisdiction between the national and state governments.” Id. at 789.
71. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354.
72. See Peter Glück et al., 7: Governance and Policies for Adaptation, in INT’L
UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., supra note 34, at 187, 190, 195–97 (follow
“Download chapter 7” hyperlink).
73. Id. at 190. See generally Peter Glück et al., 4: Changes in the Governance
of Forest Resources, in INT’L UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., FORESTS IN THE
GLOBAL BALANCE—CHANGING PARADIGMS 51, 72 (2005), available at http://
www.iufro.org/science/special/wfse/forests-global-balance (follow “Changes in the
Governance of Forest Resources” hyperlink).
74. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (negotiator uses the threat of
a domestic veto in the ratification process as a means to tie her hands in the negotiations). Other scholars have noted the trend towards a bottom-up approach for
forests. See Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre & Rebecca Hardin, Changing Governance of the World’s Forests, 320 SCI. MAG. 1460, 1460 (2008); see also Glück et
al., supra note 72, at 197.
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verning bodies to participate in the efficient management of resources, and the provision of economic incentives as a driver of
behavioral change—or, as noted, a bottom-up approach. 75 Accordingly, many scholars no longer see traditional regulation
prescribed in an insular and rigid fashion by individual nation
states as the most effective means of achieving global governance. 76
Weinthal and I characterized the impact of international
negotiations on internal domestic regulatory forest policy as an
“outside-in” limitation on traditional governance, 77 but we argued that domestic governance structures like U.S. federalism
constitute an “inside-out” limitation on traditional forest governance at both the national and international levels. 78 A
thorough analysis of often overlooked “inside-out” limitations
like federalism is crucial given that the United States’ participation is a key component for any effective international treaty
on forests, and that the United States is governed by a “constitutionally entrenched federal system.” 79 We suggested that,
because the U.S. federal system places primary private land
use regulatory authority within the hands of state governments, 80 to ensure the success of any international treaty
aimed at forests, voluntary, market-based mechanisms—like
REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction
programs—must be utilized. This approach would ensure U.S.
participation in any legally binding treaty aimed at global forest management and would avoid any questions as to whether

75. Glück et al., supra note 72, at 195–97.
76. Id. at 195.
77. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355. An example of “outside-in”
constraints on the U.S. legal system is the “Tuna-Dolphin” controversy. Due to
the vast numbers of dolphins killed by the tuna industry off the western coast of
Mexico, in the 1980s Congress amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to
ban the import of tuna unless it could be shown that the tuna was caught using
“dolphin-friendly” nets. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 567.
Mexico challenged the trade restriction before the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”). The GATT panel ruled in favor of Mexico, stating that the
United States could not base trade restrictions on the “process and productions
method” in violation of Articles I and III of GATT. Id. at 568. Instead, according
to GATT, trade restrictions needed to be product-specific. Id. Thus an “outside”
international agreement on trade placed limitations on the implementation of a
domestic law in the United States.
78. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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federalism would limit the treaty power in the area of private
forest regulation. 81
The use of voluntary, market-based mechanisms would be
consistent with the trend in global forest governance demonstrating a general “downward shift from national to subnational levels,” or, decentralization, 82 facilitating the use of such
non-prescriptive mechanisms.
These mechanisms also
represent the increasingly promoted “neoliberal” approach to
environmental governance, which posits that environmental
goals can be best achieved not through the state prescribing
targets and enforcing compliance, but rather through implementing voluntary measures and market-based policies. 83
Maintaining consistency with the general global trend of decentralization is important for the United States since U.S. federalism “represents a specific legal constitutional requirement
for decentralization, whereby a national government is judicially required to divulge regulatory authority to subnational units
(the states) in the area of direct forest management.” 84 Otherwise, U.S. federalism may inhibit the United States’ willingness to enter into, and ability to successfully implement, a treaty related to forests.
It appears U.S. federalism concerns have not entered into
the calculus in past forest treaty negotiations. As noted, U.S.
negotiators’ past hesitancy to address forests with a binding
treaty appears to have had more to do with defending sovereignty over U.S. resources than with anticipating judicial
challenges to domestic treaty implementation. 85 Going forward, however, the United States would be more likely to lead
regarding binding global forest governance if it does not anticipate federalism-based limitations on its ability to implement a
treaty aimed at forests. 86 As demonstrated in the next section,
removal of such domestic legal limitations for the United
States will be crucial to the formation and success of any global
treaty aimed at forests.

81. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355.
82. Glück et al., supra note 73, at 55.
83. David Humphreys, The Politics of ‘Avoided Deforestation’: Historical Context and Contemporary Issues, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 433, 435 (2008).
84. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355.
85. See Scholz, supra note 42, at 15.
86. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355.
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Importance of U.S. Participation in Treaty Formation

The United States’ participation is crucial to the success of
any global treaty on forest management. The United States is
a party to only one-third of existing international environmental agreements and has failed to sign or ratify many significant
international environmental treaties—including most recently
the Kyoto Protocol. 87 Without uncompromised U.S. participation, however, a future treaty aimed at forest management will
not materialize in a way that comprehensively and effectively
addresses either sustainable forestry or the carbon sequestration values of forests. 88
The United States is one of the greatest emitters of carbon
in the world, with the second highest total and per capita carbon emissions as of 2008, 89 and is already considering regulation of industrial carbon domestically. 90 As discussed, including forests in a post-Kyoto climate treaty would bolster carbon
markets and potentially encourage the United States to join
the next climate treaty. In past climate negotiations, the United States sought carbon offsets—such as those potentially provided by forests—to reduce the economic burdens of potential
international carbon emissions regulation. 91 In fact, the United States has included carbon offset mechanisms in various
domestic legislative carbon proposals. 92 Forests provide significant carbon offset potential that may be crucial to achieving
U.S. cooperation on climate negotiations in the international
arena. 93
Commentators also recognize that the United States’ participation and support is a necessary part of any future standalone forest treaty. 94 Scholars have focused on

87. Fischer, supra note 19, at 199. Though the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, it never ratified it domestically.
88. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.
89. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/
each-countrys-share-of-co2.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
90. See supra note 13.
91. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356. See David M. Reiner, Climate
Impasse: How The Hague Negotiation Failed, ENV’T, Mar. 2001, at 36, 38.
92. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.
93. See Davenport, supra note 33, at 123–24 (discussing the economic incentives provided by forests).
94. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.
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US leadership in the international environmental policy
arena, not only because of the US’ economic size and influence but also because the US has some of the most stringent
environmental regulations in the world . . . . [T]he US is
critical to an effective outcome in global environmental issue areas. . . . [A] focus on the US as a necessary member of
the pro[-forest agreement] coalition is justified by the fact
that the US is likely to bear a far greater proportion—in absolute terms—of the cost of any measures required for manipulating effective agreement than any other single
state. 95

Even so, the United States has forged a “powerful veto coalition in opposition to any further internationally binding instrument” on forest management. 96 As previously noted, past
U.S. opposition to a forest treaty had more to do with domestic
politics and national sovereignty 97 than with concerns over federalism, and the United States has yet to raise federalism as a
potential restraint on its treaty power as justification for its
failure to support a global forest treaty. 98
Binding forest treaty negotiations are not the only international negotiations in which domestic politics have inhibited
the United States from taking a leadership role on a subject of
global environmental concern, as past climate negotiations
have been similarly affected. For example, during the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations the United States insisted that participating countries be able to meet emissions reductions through
flexible methods—such as the use of carbon sinks—to offset
emissions. 99 The EU coalition and other countries, however,
supported “strict rules” to significantly reduce emissions.100
Also, the United States insisted that developing countries be
subject to emissions reduction requirements, as evidenced by
the Senate’s passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which demanded that any international climate agreement bind developing countries to the same degree as the developed world. 101
Commentators have criticized the United States’ acute focus on flexibility as contributing to Kyoto’s failure—though
Kyoto did assign numbers for overall emissions reductions, it
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Davenport, supra note 33, at 111.
Scholz, supra note 42, at 9.
Id. at 15.
No such instances were found during research for this Article.
Reiner, supra note 91, at 38.
Id.
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
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failed to specify the means by which reductions would be
achieved, simply asserting that flexibility mechanisms would
be “supplemental to domestic actions.” 102 Furthermore, the
United States’ political stance that developing countries should
have been subject to Kyoto targets ultimately led to the United
States’ failure to ratify and implement the protocol domestically. 103 In the end, despite international recognition that U.S.
participation is crucial for the success of international environmental agreements, the United States has continued to allow domestic political disputes to negatively impact its willingness to enter into agreements on both forests and climate.
C.

Potential Effects of Federalism on U.S. Treaty
Participation and Implementation

Importantly, there is a key difference between the domestic political issues that hamstrung U.S. negotiators in both
previous forest management and climate talks, which were
largely ideological, and domestic legal issues that potentially
could derail a future treaty including forest management. Future international efforts to secure and implement a global
treaty aimed at forest management may fail because the United States’ very constitutional structure may hinder it from taking a leadership role. The United States faces an important
domestic legal obstacle, largely ignored by scholarship on forest
negotiations, that may impede its willingness and ability to
participate in a global treaty on forest management. As further discussed in Part III, there is great uncertainty regarding
whether U.S. federalism impedes Congress’s ability to implement binding, prescriptive land use regulations even if mandated by international treaty. 104 Indeed, the potential for
management conflicts in the area of natural resources law arises directly out of a constitutional structure that is said to have
“split the atom of sovereignty” 105 and, thus, to have ignited a
seemingly unending controversy over the proper division of
regulatory authority between the state and federal governments—especially regarding the scope of the treaty power.

102. Reiner, supra note 91, at 39.
103. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
104. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.
105. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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How might this conflict potentially play out in the area of
forest management? Suppose the United States enters into an
international treaty that included prescriptive directives requiring Congress to pass implementing legislation establishing
nation-wide forest management mandates on publicly and privately owned lands—such as the creation of nation-wide buffer
zones in forested watersheds. The nature of the implementing
legislation effectively could prohibit U.S. participation in the
treaty because U.S. federalism divides regulatory authority
over land use between the federal and state governments. 106
This division of authority presents a unique problem in the
United States because even though central governments own
roughly 86 percent of the world’s forests and wooded areas
worldwide, 107 U.S. state and federal governments own no more
than 40 percent of U.S. forestland. 108 The remaining 60 percent of U.S. forestland is in private ownership. This public/
private divide in the United States is a remarkable break from
the global pattern of forest ownership. Furthermore, an estimated 89 percent of the timber harvested in the United States
comes from private lands. 109
In turn, private land use regulation is the primary purview
of state governments, to exercise as a “police power” for protection of the “general welfare.” 110 Certain police powers available
to the states are not available to the federal government under
the Constitution; the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reserves for the states all powers not so delegated and may act as
a limit on Congress’s regulatory authority, “particularly in
‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land
use.” 111 Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in . . . [the
106. In fact, though related more to political sovereignty than to concerns
about federalism, the United States’ opposition to a forest convention in 1997 is
partially explained by its concern that environmentalists would have too great an
influence over the treaty and its “fears about environmental requirements finding
their way into the agreement.” GARETH PORTER, JANET W. BROWN & PAMELA S.
CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 209 (3d. ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
107. Agrawal, Chhatre & Hardin, supra note 74, at 1460.
108. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www.
unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdf.htm (follow “Forests” hyperlink).
109. Id.
110. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657–59 (1887).
111. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource
Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCE LAW AND POLICY 124, 132
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010).
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United States] leaves the states in charge of regulating how
private land is used” 112 and that “[l]and use law has always
been a creature of state and local law.” 113 The landmark land
use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 114 has been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private property.” 115 Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the States’ traditional and
primary power over land . . . use” 116 and that “[r]egulation of
land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.” 117
To be clear, private land use activities are affected by federal regulations passed by Congress under other sources of authority in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause or
treaty-making power. A number of federal regulations have an
effect on private landowner activities without violating the
Tenth Amendment. Both the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
and Clean Water Act (“CWA”), each passed pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power, limit private property owners’
land use rights to a degree. Specifically with regard to forests,
the ESA prevents certain landowner logging activities that
might endanger or threaten a certain species, and the CWA regulates “nonpoint” sources of water pollution arising out of logging activities. 118 Indeed, courts have rejected state Tenth
Amendment challenges to congressional authority to protect
endangered species under the ESA, 119 fish under the Magnu112. JOHN R. NOLAN, PATRICIA
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17

E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE
(7th ed. 2008).
113. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311,
335 (2003).
114. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
115. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006).
116. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44
(1944)) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments.”).
117. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see
also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use
is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”) (emphasis added).
118. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 1308. Nonpoint
sources of water pollution are those not arising out of a “discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance” as do point sources. Id. at 1012 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (2006)). Examples of nonpoint sources of water pollution include livestock waste, stormwater runoff from parking lots, and sediment runoff from recently logged forestland.
119. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1238–42 (D. Wyo.
2005).
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son-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,120
and air quality under the Clean Air Act. 121
The effects of these federal acts on land use activities generally, however, are tangential to the primary purposes of the
regulations, which are to protect endangered species, water
and air quality, and other resources—not to directly govern
how private lands are to be managed generally. 122 Rather,
states currently maintain direct regulatory authority over private forest management activities and are at present responsible for establishing stand density, reforestation, and riparian
buffer zone requirements; governing clear-cutting practices;
and implementing a wide variety of other best management
practices. 123 In fact, Congress itself has recognized the tangential effects on land use related to its regulation of other resources. For example, the CWA explicitly recognizes federalism
limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate land use, stating
that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to . . . plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .” 124
Additionally, federal statutes may influence state regulation of forest management, as states may pass or modify state
laws to meet federal clean water and endangered species requirements. 125 Even so, a review of U.S. judicial precedent and
traditionally accepted forest management practices may distinguish the permissible, tangential influencing effects of federal
120. Connecticut v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237, 248 (D. Conn. 2005).
121. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 883 (4th Cir. 1996).
122. See Paul Ellefson, Anthony Cheng & Robert J. Moulton, State Forest Practice Regulatory Programs: An Approach to Implementing Ecosystem Management
on Private Forest Lands in the United States, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 421, 421–22
(1997).
123. See JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (2006). It should
be noted that logging is only one activity in which forest owners potentially engage. Non-industrial uses of private forests are even more clearly in the zone of
power reserved to the states, as they are subject to state and local zoning and development laws. It seems clear that the federal government cannot establish zoning schemes for states or municipalities. Some municipalities even use zoning as
a means of regulating land use related to forestry. For example, a Pennsylvania
municipality’s zoning ordinance prohibits clearcutting of forests on tracts which
are larger than two acres and on slopes greater than 15 percent. Id. at 871 (citing
Williams Township Zoning Ordinance 2001-3).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
125. For example, states may adjust riparian buffer zone regulations. See supra, note 123 and accompanying text.
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statutes on state regulations from potentially impermissible
federal interference with primary state authority over forest
management. Courts have recognized both the CWA and ESA
as valid under the Commerce Clause, despite the limitations
they impose on private land use. 126 The validity of private forest management at the federal level, however, has never been
judicially tested, as the federal government has never attempted to directly regulate private forest management activities. 127 As noted above, courts have consistently recognized the
“quintessential” authority of states to regulate land use, and
just as with zoning authority established in Euclid, 128 forest
management falls squarely within the realm of traditional land
use activities regulated by the state. 129 Due to a lack of federal
intent to regulate in the area of private forest management,
courts have yet to extend application of the Commerce Clause
to private forests. As such, it appears that the accepted practice of direct state regulation of private forest activities remains intact. 130
Also potentially affecting private land use activities are international treaties entered into by the federal government for
the protection of certain natural resources—as demonstrated in
the 1920 U.S. Supreme Court case of Missouri v. Holland,131
discussed below. 132 As noted below, however, Holland may be
distinguishable on its facts, as the treaty at issue in that case,
like the ESA and CWA, regulates resources tangentially related to the direct land use activities of private property owners. In addition, the federal government has never asserted, by
treaty, authority over private forest management practices traditionally regulated by states. 133 In short, even though federal
statutes and treaties may affect land use activities of private
landowners, the federal government has never before attempted to directly regulate private forest management, and
126. See generally GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, JR., supra note 115, at 1086–102
(ESA); RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 826–27, 853–65
(CWA).
127. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 357.
128. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
129. Ellefson, Cheng & Moulton, supra note 122, at 429.
130. Beyond the scope of this Article is whether federal regulation of private
forests could withstand judicial scrutiny under an expanded understanding of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—that is, if forest products might be considered
articles of “Commerce . . . among the several states.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
131. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
132. See infra Part III.B.
133. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 357–58.
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thus courts have never considered the validity of any federal
attempts to do so.
Ultimately, because of U.S. federalism, the types of forest
management directives that might arise out of either a postKyoto climate framework or a stand-alone forest treaty will
impact the viability of the treaty within the United States and,
equally important, affect treaty formation in the first instance
since the United States’ participation in treaty negotiations is
essential. 134 This is especially so since the United States has
previously invoked federalism as a reason to avoid treaty formation in several other contexts. As noted by Professor Bradley, “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties because of
a concern that the treaties would infringe on the reserved powers of the states.” 135 In addition, in the past “U.S. representatives insisted that they could not agree to a treaty regulating
certain labor conditions because those matters were within the
reserved powers of the states. These states’ rights concerns
continued to inhibit U.S. participation in private international
law, labor, and other treaty regimes even after Holland.” 136
Other scholars have noted that, much more recently, perceived federalism limitations have reduced U.S. bargaining
power at the negotiating table by encouraging the United
States to act in outright opposition to treaty formation, to seek
exemptions in treaties that modify the obligations of states, or
to provide concessions to the states in domestic implementation. 137 Ultimately, nations with federal systems, like the
134. Id. at 358.
135. Bradley II, supra note 19, at 131–32 (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored
State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules
of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931)).
136. Id. at 132.
137. Swaine, supra note 2, at 410. Swaine noted that, based upon perceived
federalism limits, the United States flatly opposed the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, sought treaty exemptions for the states with a variety of human
rights treaties and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and provided
concessions to the states in domestic implementation of trade matters like the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Id. at 409–10. Swaine noted that
recent U.S. practices may persuade [the Supreme Court] to look more
skeptically at the equivalence of a treaty and its legislative implementation. . . . Congress did take specific steps to implement the Uruguay
Round Agreements and NAFTA, but in each case pointedly impaired the
effectiveness of the agreement for the states’ sake; in other matters, like
the Agreement on Government Procurement, the United States more
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United States, “may decline altogether to enter into a treaty
that poses a serious risk of conflict with their constitutions. At
the domestic level, well-grounded constitutional principles may
be insurmountable, as may more pedestrian limits imposed by
legislation particular to the treaty.” 138 Thus, U.S. federalism is
predisposed to conflict with principles of international law, not
only in the negotiation of treaties, but perhaps more importantly in the implementation of treaties governing areas considered
the subject of traditional state authority, like forest management. Because the United States has allowed federalism to
limit its ability and willingness to participate in international
treaties in the past, it is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the relationship between international law and federalism and of how to avoid conflicts that may arise between
the two.
D. International Law on Federalism—a Restraint on
Treaty Participation?
Federal government claims of domestic political restraints
on treaty implementation are not limited to the United States,
but such claims gain particular traction when based on entrenched constitutional grounds, such as those arising out of
the United States Constitution. As Professor Swaine has
noted, “[f]ederal states not infrequently seek broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on
more genuine constitutional limits. Much the same may be
said with respect to . . . outright refusals to participate based
on federalism grounds.” 139 With the United States’ federalism
principles embedded in the Constitution, and a long history of
jurisprudence developing federalism’s scope, scholars rightly
have questioned what would happen to U.S. treaty obligations
if the U.S. Constitution indeed establishes federalism limitations on the treaty power. 140
International law and U.S. constitutional law have been
said to “exhibit a kind of passive hostility toward one anothforthrightly negotiated internationally and domestically for purely voluntary subscription by American states.
Id. at 420–21.
138. Id. at 461–62.
139. Id. at 445–46.
140. Id. at 449.
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er.” 141 From the perspective of the U.S. legal system, international law cannot affect the operation of the Constitution,
which “operates as an absolute constraint on how U.S. obligations may be observed.” 142 From the perspective of international law, however, international law prevails over domestic
legislation and constitutions. The rules governing legal agreements among nations, “addressing the formation, application,
interpretation, modification, termination, and validity of treaties,” are codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”). 143 The Vienna Convention has
been described as the “treaty on treaties.” 144 Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention provides that “[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty,” 145 and this provision has been described as
codification of a “preexisting principle of customary international law that makes no exception for federal states.” 146 In
addition, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that
“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.” 147
141. Id.
142. Id. Hollis has described “the treaty” as
liv[ing] a double life. By day, it is a creature of international law, which
sets forth extensive substantive and procedural rules by which the treaty
must operate. . . . By night, however, the treaty leads a more domestic
life. In its domestic incarnation, the treaty is a creature of national law,
deriving its force from the constitutional order of the nation state that
concluded it. Within the United States, therefore, the Constitution governs. Just as we look to international law to discern treaty rules on the
international plane, so too must we look to the Constitution for substantive or procedural rules by which the treaty functions within the U.S. legal system.
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1327–28.
143. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 156 (2010).
144. Id.
145. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
146. Swaine, supra note 2, at 450.
147. See Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at 339, 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8082, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its
obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international
law.”), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1297 (1970). Swaine has further elaborated
that
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Ultimately, international law is supposedly “indifferent”
toward federalism. 148 Arguments that a federal domestic governance structure provides an excuse for treaty noncompliance
have been described as “heretical” 149 because “a particular
country’s constitutional difficulties are its own, and a choice in
all events that is not to be visited upon the rest of the
world.” 150 Despite international law’s seemingly stern outsidein perspective on federalism, however, the United States’ inside-out perspective is quite different—especially considering
the rise of the new federalism. Scholars have argued that
suggestions that international law might actually insinuate
itself into the U.S. Constitution, particularly those provisions governing relations among domestic institutions,
would surely be resisted. . . . U.S. courts (usually) try to interpret statutes in conformity with treaty and other international obligations. But constitutional law, in the American system, is a different kettle of fish, and in U.S. courts
even run-of-the-mill federal statutes—including those protecting state interests—may erase any undesired implications from international law. While Supreme Court justices
occasionally preach the need to pay attention to the legal
world outside U.S. borders, the Court’s case law seemingly
limits international law’s potential relevance to the new federalism. 151

The United States’ reluctance to allow international obligations to impact domestic governance actually merges fairly
consistently with the true state of affairs in international law.
international law addresses federalism indirectly through the metaobligation of pacta sunt servanda—the fundamental principle that treaties are to be obeyed—and its corollary duty of good faith (to which I will
refer, in the aggregate, as a duty of good faith). . . . This principle . . .
supports, of course, the notion that a state’s international responsibilities prevail over any inconsistent domestic law. More particularly, it
imposes an affirmative duty to bring internal legislation, at whatever
level of government, into line with treaty obligations. Nations are unambiguously responsible for enacting domestic legislation necessary to
implement their treaty obligations, and likewise cannot enforce laws
that conflict with their international duties . . . .
Swaine, supra note 2, at 453–54.
148. Swaine, supra note 2, at 450.
149. Id. at 452. Swaine stated, however, that it “remains . . . manifestly harder
for federal governments to ensure compliance, and the abstract availability of
remedies for noncompliance hardly makes up the difference.” Id.
150. Id. at 451.
151. Id. at 468–70.
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In reality, though the position of international law relative to
domestic constitutional federalism is stated in fairly stark
terms, international law has in fact treated domestic constitutional law with greater deference. 152 As noted, accommodation
is frequently made during negotiations for federal nations that
claim constitutional hurdles to treaty requirements, an occurrence that “reflect[s] a more general understanding that a party’s constitutional constraints are less tractable.” 153 Even after
a treaty is formed, international law may concede to the federalist position. For example, as Swaine has noted, the 1999
proceedings regarding two German nationals convicted of murder in Arizona, Karl and Walter LaGrand, were concluded by
provisional order that sought to limit Arizona’s death penalty
procedures as a violation of the Vienna Convention. 154 The
United States argued that it could not intervene because its
federal system imposed limits that designated such procedures
the sole purview of the states and thus not subject to the treaty. 155 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ultimately issued an order finding that international law “ ‘did not require
the United States to exercise powers it did not have,’ but rather
established an obligation ‘to take all measures at its disposal’
to prevent the German national’s [sic] execution prior to the
Court’s final decision.” 156 Clearly, the powers that the United
States claimed it did not have in the LaGrand proceedings
were powers that instead were reserved for the states under
the Tenth Amendment (development of death penalty procedures) and protected by federalism principles. 157
The ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand proceedings actually follows quite naturally from the language of Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention, providing that though international treaties are binding, they must be implemented by countries in
“good faith.” 158 This good faith provision, and the ICJ’s recognition that nation states need not exercise powers they do not
have within their domestic regulatory tool belt, is arguably an
152. Id. at 456.
153. Id. at 457.
154. Id.
155. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 500 (June 27) (noting that
U.S. pleadings cited as a “constraining factor . . . the character of the United
States of America as a federal republic of divided powers”).
156. Swaine, supra note 2, at 457 (quoting LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 508).
157. See generally Evan Mandery, Federalism and the Death Penalty, 66 ALB.
L. REV. 809 (2003).
158. Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at 339.
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implicit recognition by the international community that treaties may be constrained by federalism. Furthermore, a “good
faith,” rather than absolute, performance requirement recognizes the difficulties in overcoming domestic constraints on
treaties when there is no enforcement mechanism or when the
compliance system of a treaty is non-binding (as is the case
with the Kyoto Protocol). 159
Ultimately, international law sends mixed messages regarding the legitimacy of claimed federalism constraints on
domestic implementation of treaties. Though the Vienna Convention asserts that countries may not invoke provisions of internal law as justification for failure to perform treaty obligations, the Convention also requires only that binding treaties
be carried out in “good faith,” which the ICJ has interpreted as
an obligation to take only such measures as are “at the disposal” of the treaty-making branch of the nation’s government.
Just as with the death penalty procedures at issue in the LaGrand proceedings, direct regulation of private land use activities such as forest management is not a regulatory measure
traditionally at the disposal of the U.S. federal government.
In the end, U.S. federalism may act as an “inside-out” domestic constraint on prescriptive “traditional governance” at
both the national and international levels, just as do “outsidein” international negotiations noted by scholars. 160 Due to the
United States’ past tendency of allowing federalism restraints
to inhibit it from participating in international treaties, in order for international forest negotiations to result in a legitimate and effective treaty addressing forest management in the
future—and one that can be constitutionally implemented in
the United States—measures other than prescriptive, traditional governance regulatory methods will need to be explored.
E.

Avoiding Federalism Limits on U.S. Treaty
Participation and Implementation

Scholars have noted that a global treaty aimed at forest
management activities would necessarily “mandate some de-

159. BODANSKY, supra note 143, at 86–87.
160. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355; see generally Glück et al.,
supra note 72, at 190, 195–97.
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gree of harmonization of forestry practices.” 161 If such a binding treaty provided prescriptive forest management directives
at the national level, however, it necessarily would involve potentially unconstitutional regulation of private lands in the
United States due to the large private ownership of forests.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has
highlighted several forest management goals that could be
achieved through a prescriptive, “traditional governance”
framework, 162 including “maintaining or increasing the forest
area” and “maintaining or increasing stand-level carbon density.” 163 Though these goals can be accomplished by voluntary,
market-based programs, the IPCC leaves the mechanism of
implementation unanswered. Thus, it is feasible that an international treaty could require signatory nations to “ ‘increase
and maintain forest area’ by prescribing, for example, mandatory maintenance of partial forest cover on all forested lands,
implementation of soil erosion reduction programmes, or limitation of fertilizer use.” 164 A likely response to such a treaty
would be constitutional challenges in the United States, with
both private forest owners and states challenging direct federal
regulation of private and state-owned forestlands. 165 For ex161. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Why is There No International Forestry Law?: An
Examination of International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private, 19
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 159 (2001).
162. Though climate negotiations are primarily concerned with forest carbon
only, the IPCC’s findings are relevant to future UNFF negotiations, as the UNFF
has also recognized the role of forest carbon in addressing climate change.
163. Gert Jan Nabuurs & Omar Masera et al., 9: Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
549 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg3_report_
mitigation_of_climate_change.htm (follow “Chapter 9: Forestry” hyperlink).
164. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 358. As an example of how these
results might be achieved, the IPCC has stated that
[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon
stocks include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize losses of dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil erosion, and by avoiding slash burning and other highemission activities. Planting after harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces carbon losses relative to natural regeneration. Economic considerations are typically the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays revenues from harvest.
The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be diminished where
increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions.
Nabuurs & Masera et al., supra note 163, at 551.
165. Claims might also be brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which grants protection for private property
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ample, a global governance scenario that required that “within
x number of years, treaty participants must increase and maintain forest area by 25 percent and implement active carbon sequestration projects on 50 percent of their forested lands” may
not be viable under the U.S. federal system because the U.S.
government arguably would be unable to ensure compliance
with the mandate on even a majority of forested lands within
its borders. Federal ownership of forests in the United States
is only 35 percent. 166 State governments would claim sole authority to pass laws prescribing increased forest density and
carbon sequestration requirements on the remaining 65 percent of forests either on private lands or in state ownership.
The federal government would then be unable to effectively
implement the treaty throughout a majority of U.S. forestlands, constraining the United States’ ability to meet its treaty
obligations.
If, however, as Weinthal and I previously suggested,167
treaty negotiations aimed at forest management incorporate
voluntary, market-based mechanisms, then these domestic
treaty implementation complications disappear. 168 Indeed,
these mechanisms arose directly out of failed past forest negotiations as governments “[u]nable to conclude treaties cementing traditional ‘command and control’ regulation in binding
conventions . . . searched for new mixes of policy instruments”
to achieve global forest governance. 169 Provision of such voluntary instruments releases the federal government from forcing
private landowners to manage forests in a prescribed manner,
which in turn frees the United States from potential federalism
complications as it implements the treaty. For example, under
a climate treaty, the mandatory regulatory requirements reowners by establishing that property may not be taken by the government without “just compensation,” though exploration of the potential success of such claims
is beyond the scope of this Article. U.S. CONST amend V.
166. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3, supra note 108, at 110.
167. See generally Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16.
168. For a discussion of a hybrid market-based/regulatory treaty solution,
based upon a global system of tradable forest conservation obligations or, rather,
a system of “beneficiaries pay” financing of forest conservation, see Jonathan
Wiener, Making Markets for Global Forest Conservation, in PAINTING THE WHITE
HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 119 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004).
169. Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capacity: Explaining Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “NextGeneration” Regulation in Canada and Europe, 19 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF
POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 251, 256 (2006).
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quired by an act of Congress implementing the treaty (i.e., carbon emissions reductions) would fall on industry emitters, not
private landowners. Furthermore, both climate and standalone forest treaties would provide market incentives to private
forest managers, as would any state regulation of forest management driven by the market.
Forest certification,170
REDD, 171 ecosystem service, 172 and similar programs173 would
170. As forest certification markets expand, demand should increase for certified forest products originating from sustainably managed forests. Forest certification markets are especially important because other private forest markets are
shrinking. For example, the U.S. pulp and paper industry largely has retreated
overseas, and large paper companies increasingly are offloading landholdings in
the United States. See April Reese, FORESTS: ‘Ecosystem Services’ at Risk from
Suburban Development, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2010/08/19/1. As foresters seek to transition timber sales from the pulp and paper industry into sawmill markets, they
should benefit from an increasing demand for certified sawmill and lumber products.
171. The inclusion of REDD programs into a future forest or climate treaty
would be wise not only because such programs are voluntary for the participants—thus avoiding federalism concerns—but also because REDD programs are
already under consideration for inclusion in a global treaty. In fact, the Rights
and Resources Initiative has noted that “REDD+ emerged as one of the rare
points of consensus from the confusion in Copenhagen.” Rights and Resources
Initiative, Fourth RRI Dialogue on Forests, Governance, & Climate Change Event
Announcement (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/
documents/files/doc_1424.pdf. Furthermore, REDD programs perhaps provide the
most effective method—both practical and economic—of using forests to fight climate change. Scholars have noted that carbon sequestration potential of REDD
projects is multiple times the potential of afforestation and reforestation projects.
Myers, supra note 6, at 1. In addition, the IPCC found that “[r]educed deforestation and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and most
immediate carbon stock impact in the short term . . . because large carbon
stocks . . . are not emitted when deforestation is prevented.” Nabuurs & Masera
et al., supra note 163, at 550. Due to the sheer magnitude of carbon that can be
sequestered under REDD programs, and the corresponding increase in carbon
credit investments made available by such programs, REDD programs provide
significant economic incentives for private foresters to participate voluntarily. In
fact, the United Kingdom government’s Stern Review on the economics of climate
change recommended a greater focus on “[c]uts in non-energy emissions, such as
those resulting from deforestation.” NICHOLAS H. STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xvii (2007).
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism allows for the generation of emissions credits for afforestation and reforestation projects but not for
programs aimed at reducing deforestation and degradation. Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the
Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2004, at 75, 81. A
shift is occurring, however, as current proposals suggest including REDD in a
post-Kyoto agreement. Murray & Olander, supra note 13. At a REDD workshop
in Cairns, Australia, in 2007, numerous countries proposed mechanisms for incorporating REDD into future climate talks. Myers, supra note 6, at 18. Similarly,
in 2005, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal on behalf of the
Coalition for Rainforest Nations to give developing countries access to the carbon
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market through credits generated from REDD programs. Id. at 17–18. Also, at
the Bali round of the UNFCCC in December 2007, delegates agreed to the “Bali
Action Plan,” which was a decision on “[r]educing emissions from deforestation in
developing countries” that “invited parties to reduce carbon emissions from forest
degradation ‘on a voluntary basis’ in order to enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” Humphreys, supra note 83, at 433–34. REDD programs
would also compliment the United States’ ever-developing movement toward a
carbon cap-and-trade program and, if it eventually occurs, could dovetail nicely
into a climate change agreement facilitating voluntary landowner participation in
forest management programs. The incentives for United States incorporation of
REDD programs into a national climate policy are clear, as REDD could greatly
reduce costs of climate change regulation. One study found that forest carbon,
sequestered primarily through REDD activities, could “cut the global cost of climate change policies in half and reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.” Myers,
supra note 6, at 25. In short, considering the potential value of REDD in reducing
the cost of climate regulation, the inertia toward including REDD into any global
treaty aimed at forest management, and U.S. federalism’s effect on U.S. treaty
participation and implementation, inclusion of REDD programs is clearly warranted.
172. Foresters might receive significant payments from ecosystem service programs. Scholars note that
forests provide important and valuable ecosystem services, offering shelter and habitat for a vast array of plant and animal species, purifying
water, sequestering carbon, and slowing rainfall to prevent flooding.
Most of these services are “free,” in the sense that they are not captured
in markets. As a result, with no obvious economic value they have often
been ignored in management decisions.
RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 1206. As an example, a soil
stabilization and erosion control project undertaken in Tucson, Arizona, included
the planting of 500,000 mesquite trees that reduced surface water runoff that
would otherwise have required the construction of $90,000 worth of detention
ponds. DOUGLAS J. KRIEGER, ECONOMIC VALUE OF FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A REVIEW (2001), reprinted in RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra
note 15, at 1207. Similarly, forest managers might receive payment for the provision of air quality services, as urban forest programs seek to remove particulate
matter from the air through forestry. The same mesquite trees in Tucson, once
they reach maturity, will remove 6,500 tons of particulate matter annually. Id. at
1208. Since Tucson spends $1.5 million on an alternative dust control program,
the air quality value of each tree is significant. Id.
As another example of the value of the forest in this regard, “45 percent of
the total water runoff in California is estimated to originate on national forests . . . . The value of water flowing from national forests, in both offstream and
instream uses, is conservatively estimated to be at least $3.7 billion per year.”
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2000 RPA ASSESSMENT OF FOREST AND
RANGE LANDS 63 (2000), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pl/rpa/rpaasses.pdf. In
short, there is money to be saved, and made, by foresters participating in marketbased ecosystem service programs.
173. A thorough description of the operation of these programs is outside the
scope of this Article. For background on forest certification programs, see Gulbrandsen, supra note 171; Graeme Auld, Ben Cashore & Deanna Newsom, Perspectives on Forest Certification: A Survey Examining Differences Among the U.S.
Forest Sectors’ Views of Their Forest Certification Alternatives, in FOREST POLICY
FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY (Benjamin Cashore, Lawrence Teeter & Daowei eds.,
2003); Andrew Long, Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of
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encourage private foresters to manage forests sustainably, as
the economic benefits from participating in those markets were
realized. 174
Ultimately, an improved carbon market providing greater
participation of forest owners in carbon-credit-generating
REDD-type programs; forest ecosystem service markets capturing watershed, air quality, biodiversity, and other values; and a
better-developed forest certification market could “fill an increasing void in the portfolios of private forest managers in the
US and at the same time induce behavioural change in forest
management that will have a positive environmental impact.” 175 Because U.S. federalism “acts as a legal constitutional driver for decentralization and the use of bottom-up mechanisms,” the international community should promote and
implement market-based programs that “allow the participation of a wide range of public, private, international and local
stakeholders.” 176
The use of forest management as a solution to climate
change is crucial. To address climate change adequately, and
to capture the multiple other ecosystem service values provided
by sustainable forestry, parties in global environmental negotiations must take into account the domestic legal structures of
key participants when crafting binding treaties aimed at forest
management. 177 Because the United States has been targeted
both as a key component of successful binding global forest governance and blamed for the recent failures of treaty formation, 178 treaty negotiators must consider the U.S. federalism
question. Failure to do so might lead to negotiations supporting top-down prescriptive regulations, which would leave the
Science, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006). For background on ecosystem service
programs, see Sara J. Scherr & Alejandra Martin eds., Katoomba Workshop II
Proceedings and Summary of Key Issues: Developing Commercial Markets for
Environmental Services of Forests (Oct. 4–6, 2000), http://www.foresttrends.org/~foresttr/documents/files/doc_801.pdf. See also Alicia Robbins, Discussion
Paper,
Ecosystem
Services
Markets
(2005),
available
at
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/2244/tp12.pdf?seq
uence=1. For background on REDD programs, see Myers, supra note 6. Though
REDD programs heretofore have been aimed at the developing world, REDD provides a model of the type of market-based mechanisms that could be implemented
in the United States to avoid federalism issues under a treaty that includes global
forest management.
174. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 359.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra Part II.B.
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United States unable to act. The next part considers U.S. federalism’s effect on the U.S. government’s treaty power in the
context of forest management and demonstrates that the highly contentious and unresolved nature of the debate lends further support for the conclusions this Article proposes.
III. AN UNENDING CONTROVERSY—DOES FEDERALISM LIMIT
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER?
The previous parts discussed how climate change offers a
new opportunity to achieve binding global governance of forests
and also analyzed the role of the United States as a potential
federalist veto player. Regarding the latter, the Article analyzed the political science driving federalism’s effects on the
formation of a treaty aimed at forests, the United States’ importance to treaty formation, the potential limiting effects of
U.S. federalism on treaty creation and domestic implementation, how international law would view such effects, and how to
avoid those effects during global forest treaty negotiation. During the foregoing analysis, however, the Article necessarily
presumed that federalism would in fact have a limiting effect
on the treaty power, in order to clearly demonstrate how the
voluntary, market-based programs proposed here provide a solution for avoiding federalism limitations. This part turns to
the resolution of whether federalism does in fact limit the U.S.
federal government’s treaty power, or more accurately, whether, based upon scholarly interpretations of constitutional law
generally and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Missouri vs. Holland specifically, there is likely to be a resolution to this question in the foreseeable future.
This part proceeds in three sections, each of which demonstrates the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the treaty
power’s scope and federalism’s potential limits upon it, especially in the area of forest management. Section A first details
the vigorous debate between constitutional law scholars over
the scope of the treaty power and whether federalism may
place any limits whatsoever on the United States’ authority to
pass domestic legislation pursuant to an international treaty.
This section is an important precursor to delving more deeply
into Missouri v. Holland, and establishes the context—that is,
the nationalist vs. new federalist debate—within which Holland is likely to be interpreted going forward. Section B then
analyzes Missouri v. Holland in more detail and discusses
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whether, within the context of the broader constitutional debate, potential limitations on the treaty power might arise out
of that case—thus emanating from the judicial branch of government—or rather out of the executive branch of government,
as some scholars have asserted. Finally, Section C presents a
more focused discussion of the treaty power and its relationship to private property rights, providing valuable insights into
how courts might rule in favor of challenges to domestic implementation of a treaty dictating forest management on private lands.
A.

Setting the Stage—the Nationalist Versus New
Federalist Debate

Constitutional law scholars are sharply divided regarding
whether federalism places the limits discussed in Part II upon
the treaty power. If federalism does not limit the federal government’s treaty power, then it matters little, for domestic implementation purposes, what types of forest policy directives
are included within a global treaty—whether voluntary, market-based, or prescriptive. If, however, federalism does limit
the treaty power, then the voluntary, market-based programs
highlighted in Part II become much more important to ensuring U.S. involvement in a successful global treaty. Even so, the
question of the treaty power’s scope in light of potential federalism limitations is anything but certain, lending support to this
Article’s argument that voluntary, market-based programs are
currently the safer route to ensuring treaty success.
During one of the most prominent scholarly skirmishes on
the scope of the treaty power, which took place in the Michigan
Law Review at the beginning of the decade, Professor David
Golove provided an accurate and useful summary of the nature
of the debate:
Characteristic of the most enduring constitutional controversies is a clash between fundamental but ultimately irreconcilable principles. Unable to synthesize opposing precepts, we visit and revisit certain issues in an endless cycle.
Each generation marches forward heedless, and sometimes
only dimly aware, of how many times the battle has already
been fought. Even the peace of exhaustion achieves only a
temporary respite.
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The abiding controversy over the relationship between the
treaty power of the national government and the legislative
powers of the states is paradigmatic in this respect. . . .
[T]he issue has been among the most passionately disputed
questions in our constitutional history. Although temporarily in hibernation, it threatens presently to break out again
into full-blown conflict.
Can the federal government enter into treaties on subjects
that are otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers? 179

Golove’s not-so-veiled exasperation with this question was a response to an article by Professor Curtis Bradley titled The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, in which Bradley argued that the treaty power is not unlimited in scope and could
be restrained by federalism principles. 180 Bradley’s article evaluated the nationalist position on the treaty power, which,
based largely on Missouri v. Holland, rejects both the idea that
the Tenth Amendment placed any restrictions on the treaty
power and the notion that there are any subject matter limitations upon the treaty power. 181 Bradley “question[ed] the nationalist view,” asserting that the treaty power “is a power to
make supreme federal law. If such law can be made on any
subject, without regard to the rights of the states, then the
treaty power gives the federal government essentially plenary
power vis-à-vis the states. Such plenary power, however, is exactly what American federalism denies.” 182
Bradley argued that if federalism means anything under
past or current understandings of constitutional law—that is,
the new federalism—then the treaty power should not be given
179. Golove, supra note 21, at 1076–77.
180. See generally Bradley I, supra note 19; Bradley II, supra note 19.
181. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 393–94 (“The nationalist view has been endorsed by a number of prominent foreign affairs commentators, as well as by the
influential Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. . . . [T]he nationalist view of the treaty power has two components. First,
largely on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, it
generally is understood today that ‘the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power
to make treaties or other agreements.’ Second, while it ‘was once widely accepted’
that treaties could be made only with respect to matters of ‘international concern,’
most commentators today either disagree with such a limitation or assume that it
is insignificant, given that most matters upon which treaties are likely to be concluded can plausibly be characterized as of international concern.”).
182. Id. at 394. Bradley went further: “we must decide whether federalism is
worth preserving. If it is, the nationalist view of the treaty power should be reconsidered.” Id. at 461.
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special immunity from federalism limitations. 183 Other scholars have made similar arguments. 184 Bradley ultimately argued that the treaty power should be subject to the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s legislative powers,
with the result that “the federal government should not be able
to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law that could
not be created by Congress.” 185 Swaine agreed, stating that the
Supreme Court “might adopt the presumption, for example,
that neither treaties nor their domestic implementation were
intended to exceed the federal government’s legislative authority. . . . [A] presumption that treaties ought not be construed in
excess of otherwise applicable limits on the national government’s power . . . has precedent.” 186 Given the new federalism,
the interpretation that the federal government’s treaty power
cannot exceed Congress’s authority to legislate pursuant to its
other constitutional powers would put federal management of
land use activities like forestry in serious doubt.
The new federalism that arose in the 1990s included a
number of cases where the Supreme Court, for the first time
since 1937, limited the scope of Congress’s domestic powers and
correlatively protected states’ rights and the traditional sub183. Id. at 394. (“My argument is simply that if federalism is to be the subject
of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears to believe—there is
no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection.
My argument is one against treaty power exceptionalism, not necessarily one in
favor of federalism.”).
184. Swaine, supra note 2, at 474–75 (stating that federalism limits “might
leave the United States with a gap between its international treaty obligations
and its ability to implement them, and that gap may be relatively more difficult
for the government to fill. . . . If the national government is indeed supposed to be
a creature of limited authority, shouldn’t the treaty power enjoy boundaries just
like any other?”); see also Fischer, supra note 19; Rosenkranz, supra note 19; Hollis, supra note 19.
185. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 450. See also id. at 456 (“Another option for
protecting federalism . . . would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers. Under this approach,
the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory powers on the federal
government, just the power to bind the United States on the international plane.
Thus, for example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the
Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers, such as the legislation
at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions. As mentioned above, this approach was endorsed by George Nicholas during the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, Thomas Jefferson in his Manual on Parliamentary Practice, and the Supreme Court in its 1836 decision, New Orleans v. United States. It
also is essentially the law in Canada, where the treaty power has been construed
not to give the national government legislative power over matters reserved to the
provinces.”).
186. Swaine, supra note 2, at 422.
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jects of state regulatory authority under the Tenth Amendment. 187 The Supreme Court invoked federalism principles to
strike down federal statutes in New York v. United States,188
United States v. Lopez, 189 City of Boerne v. Flores, 190 Printz v.
United States, 191 and United States v. Morrison. 192 In New
York, the Court found the statute invalid because it was “inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution,” 193 while in Printz the Court found
the statute invalid because it “compromise[d] the structural
framework of dual sovereignty.” 194 Furthermore, in the Court’s
187. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1936.
188. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal
statute that effectively compelled state disposal of radioactive waste).
189. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal
statute criminalizing the possession of firearms near school zones).
190. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating a federal
statute for exceeding Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amendment).
191. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a federal
statute requiring state law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on
handgun purchasers).
192. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal
statute providing a civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no
criminal charges were filed).
193. 505 U.S. at 177.
194. 521 U.S. at 932. Bradley noted that “[i]t was obvious by [Printz] that the
Court was treating the Tenth Amendment (broadly defined) as a restraint on delegated powers. Indeed, two concurring justices, including the author of the earlier New York decision, stated this expressly.” Bradley II, supra note 19, at 115.
Another scholar has noted about Printz:
The Court[ ] . . . asked whether the Act was consistent with the structure of the Constitution. In this section, the Court discussed the nature
of federalism and emphasized the “residuary and inviolable sovereignty”
of the states. This sovereignty, the Court asserted, is implicit in numerous provisions of the Constitution and explicit in the Tenth Amendment.
The Court did not focus on the scope of the Commerce Clause to determine where federal power began and state sovereignty ended. Instead, it
inferred a zone of state sovereignty based on the constitutional provisions cited by Justice Scalia and on the Framers’ intent. “The Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not States.” The Court also rejected the federal
government’s contention that Congress’s power to regulate handguns
under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper
Clause, established the Brady Act’s constitutionality. “When a ‘La[w] . . .
for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we
mentioned earlier . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause . . . .’ ”
Here again, it is difficult to see how the Court’s conclusion would
change if the Brady Act were based on a treaty. Unlike in New York, the
Court did not base its conclusion on the boundaries of the Commerce
Clause. So one cannot say that while the commerce power extends to
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subsequent unanimous decision in Reno v. Condon, the Court
stated that “[i]n New York and Printz, we held federal statutes
invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over
the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the
principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.” 195
Though this shift in the Supreme Court’s perspective on
domestic federal authority might seem to be a victory for those
supporting federalism principles, Bradley warned that the Supreme Court’s reassertion of federalism protections “is likely to
increase the importance of the scope of the treaty power. If the
treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions, as the nationalist view maintains, then it may be a vehicle for the
enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of Congress’s
domestic lawmaking powers.” 196 Once again, Swaine agreed,
stating that “[t]he new federalism decisions also invite fresh
scrutiny of the treaty power by encouraging its creative use to
circumvent federalism restrictions.” 197 Swaine cited scholars
arguing that the statutes struck down in City of Boerne and
Morrison could (and should) effectively be reenacted if legislated pursuant to an international treaty. 198 Both the CWA
and the ESA have received similar attention, as scholars have
asserted that potential “as applied” constitutional challenges to
these acts could be rendered moot if the resources in question

point A, the treaty power might extend further to point B. Instead, the
Court independently identifies point X—the line of state sovereignty—
and declares that federal action past this point is impermissible. One
might suggest that the Court would move point X for prudential reasons
if the treaty power were invoked, but there is no indication of such flexibility in the Court’s opinion. Indeed, it declares that protecting state
sovereignty is essential to preserving liberty. It would seem difficult for
the Court to surrender that sovereignty simply because Congress was
clever enough to package the Brady Act in a treaty.
Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the
Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726, 1739–40 (1998) (alterations to quotations
in original) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 919, 920, 923–24).
195. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000).
196. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 400.
197. Swaine, supra note 2, at 417.
198. Id. See also Bradley II, supra note 19, at 100 (“[A] group of international
law scholars filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that, even if the statute exceeded
Congress’s powers (as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded), it should be
upheld as a valid implementation of a treaty.”) (citing Brief of Amici Curiae on
Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of
Petitioners at 28–30, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 990005, 99-0029)).
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were protected pursuant to an international treaty. 199 Nonetheless, “[b]ecause such arguments rely on an apparent inconsistency between Holland and the new federalism, they arguably increase its vulnerability to being reinterpreted, narrowed,
or overruled.” 200
Professor Katrina Kuh framed the balance between the
new federalism and the treaty power more directly and assessed “how the treaty power will be recast in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s revitalized approach to federalism.” 201 Kuh stated that the nationalist view of the treaty
power as unlimited in scope “ignores both historical uncertainty about the bounds of the treaty power as well as new legal
scholarship questioning the continued vitality of strong versions of the treaty power in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
federalism jurisprudence.” 202 Kuh argued that the holding in
Missouri v. Holland, to the extent that the nationalist camp interpreted it as immunizing the treaty power from the constraints of the Tenth Amendment, may be called into question
given the new federalism jurisprudence of the Court. 203 She
ultimately concluded that “as scholars undertake critical examinations of the treaty power, they will generally agree that
some type of limitation on the treaty power is imminent and/or
warranted . . . . [A]rticulation of a limitation on the nationalist
view of the treaty power is both inevitable and advisable.” 204
Golove responded rather forcefully to what he viewed as
misguided new federalism reinterpretations of the nationalist

199. Fischer, supra note 19, at 173–74 (“Although the Supreme Court did not
reach the issue, commentators on the SWANCC decision have suggested that the
treaty power provides a ground independent of the Commerce Clause for upholding the constitutionality of the CWA’s reach to include isolated, intrastate water
bodies. Gavin R. Villareal and Omar N. White have evaluated (in separate articles) the possibility of employing the treaty power to support the ESA.”) (citing
Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC,
[June 2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,669; Gavin R. Villareal, Note,
One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1998);
Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional
Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215
(2000)).
200. Swaine, supra note 2, at 417.
201. Fischer, supra note 19, at 175. Professor Kuh was known as Professor
Fischer at the time this Article was written.
202. Id. at 177.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id. at 180–81.
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perspective on the treaty power. 205 In Golove’s view, the question was simply a matter of whether the treaty power was an
independently granted “delegated” power to the national government, taking it outside any restrictions generated by the
Tenth Amendment. 206 Golove answered in the affirmative.
Furthermore, Golove took issue with Bradley’s interpretation
of the constitutional history relied upon by the nationalist
camp, asserted that Bradley’s view was “entirely unwarranted,” and argued that it is actually “the states’ rights view
that must stretch for historical validation.” 207 The tense disconnect between the two camps was apparent as Golove accused Bradley of ignoring contrary precedents and found Bradley’s approach “particularly inadequate” and “entirely without
support in the Constitution.” 208 Golove also found “unpersuasive” Bradley’s contention that the treaty power would be virtually unlimited without federalism restraints. 209
Bradley counterpunched even more forcefully, describing
portions of Golove’s analysis as “polemical and exaggerated in
tone and substance.” 210 Bradley claimed that Golove inhibited
debate on the scope of the treaty power by “largely fail[ing] to
engage” his critique. 211 Also, Bradley stated that Golove’s
analysis “reflects a false assumption about the views of other
foreign affairs scholars” and that it “more importantly, lacks
any meaningful content.” 212 Bradley asserted that Golove,
while purportedly accepting the new federalism, provided analysis that is “inconsistent” with the decisions upon which new
205. Golove, supra note 21, at 1079 (“Given a seven-to-two decision rendered
by a Court well known for its sensitivity to federalism concerns—a decision that
has been on the books for eighty years, repeatedly reaffirmed and never questioned by the Court, and the object of a highly publicized but failed effort to
amend the Constitution—it is difficult to see what justification there could be now
for overruling such a venerable decision. Yet, that is precisely what Professor
Curtis Bradley forcefully advocated in Treaty Power and American Federalism,
recently published in this Review.”).
206. Id. at 1087–88. (“Under this view—the nationalist view—the treaty power is the same as any of the other enumerated powers, except that it is granted to
the President and Senate in Article II, rather than to Congress in Article I. In
contrast, the states’ rights view, at least in its most plausible formulation, denies
that the treaty power is, in the relevant sense, ‘delegated.’ Rather, it is just
another method for exercising the powers given to the national government in Article I.”).
207. Id. at 1278.
208. Id. at 1278–79.
209. Id. at 1287.
210. Bradley II, supra note 19, at 98.
211. Id. at 99.
212. Id.
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federalism is based. 213 Finally, Bradley was particularly critical of Golove’s historical analysis, finding it to be “methodologically inconsistent and tendentious.” 214 Even more pointedly,
Bradley asserted that “[a] central complaint about the use of
history by legal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and
twisted in order to support a particular conclusion. It is in this
sense that, notwithstanding its length, Golove’s historical discussion may be considered law office history.” 215
Ultimately, this scholarly skirmish demonstrates—at the
very least—that the issue of whether federalism places limits
on the treaty power is highly contentious among prominent
scholars and is as of yet unresolved. As Bradley stated,
The scope of the treaty power has been debated numerous
times throughout this nation’s history. The issue has resurfaced in recent years for a number of reasons, including the
Supreme Court’s revitalization of federalism restraints in
the domestic arena and an expansion in the scope and range
of U.S. treatymaking. . . .

....

. . . Golove’s article fails to appreciate the legitimate reasons
why the treaty power question has been a persistent feature
of American political and legal discourse, and why, in this
age of globalization, the question once again merits our attention. 216

This constitutional uncertainty alone is arguably enough to
discourage the United States from supporting, at least at the
present, a forest management treaty that would raise such debatable federalism concerns. The next section, however, turns
to Missouri v. Holland, assesses it in the context of the recent
scholarly debates on the scope of the treaty power, and analyzes where land use activities, like forest management, fall along
the spectrum of the treaty power’s scope. The next section also
analyzes an alternative treaty power limitation put forth by
Professor Duncan Hollis, arising out of the executive branch,

213. Id.
214. Id. Notably, Bradley argued that Golove “overstates the degree to which
Supreme Court precedent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland. Most
of the decisions Golove cites as ‘affirming the nationalist view’ simply held that
valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.” Id. at 130.
215. Id. at 124.
216. Id. at 132–33.
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which could complicate forest treaty formation even if the judiciary ultimately refuses to revisit Missouri v. Holland.
B.

Missouri v. Holland—Death by Judicial Review or
Executive Federalism?

Scholars have described Missouri v. Holland as the
“benchmark” for the Treaty Clause authority of the federal
government to regulate certain natural resources 217 and “perhaps the most famous and most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs.” 218 Importantly, scholars have observed that Holland “is in deep tension with the fundamental
constitutional principle of enumerated legislative powers, and
it is therefore of enormous theoretical importance.” 219 The following review of Holland is not meant to resolve the constitutional questions presented but rather to demonstrate that the
debatable nature of the case’s precedential value for forest regulation creates even more uncertainty regarding federalism’s
potential limits on the treaty power—thus advancing this Article’s argument that such federalism complications should be
avoided during current negotiations on forests.
The events giving rise to Holland arose out of a December
8, 1916, treaty between the United States and Great Britain
recognizing that “many species of birds in their annual migrations traversed many parts of the United States and of Canada
. . . were of great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection.” 220 The two countries
agreed to pass domestic conservation legislation to implement
the treaty. 221 To that end, the United States passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”) to prohibit the killing, capturing, or selling of any migratory birds covered by the treaty. 222
The State of Missouri challenged a U.S. game warden’s authority to enforce the MBTA, arguing the act was unconstitutional
as an interference with the rights reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. 223 Missouri also asserted the tradition
217. LAITOS ET AL., supra note 123, at 1200–01.
218. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
190 (2d ed. 1996).
219. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1869.
220. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 430–31.
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of state control over wildlife to support its claim. 224 In response, the federal government argued the statute was valid
under the treaty-making power granted to it by the Constitution. 225
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that Article II of the Constitution expressly delegates authority to the
federal government to create treaties. 226 Furthermore, the
Court noted that Article VI declares that treaties are made under the “authority of the United States” and that federal laws
passed under the Constitution are the supreme law of the
land. 227 The Court found that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can
be no dispute about the validity of the [MBTA] under Article I,
§ 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of
the Government.” 228 The Court found that the MBTA did not
contravene any specific portion of the Constitution, and thus
was valid—unless it was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment
under the facts of the case. 229 The Court stated that “[t]he language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being
general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into
the ground upon which the present supposed exception is
placed,” 230 and that “[n]o doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
may override its power . . . . [I]t only remains to consider the
application of established rules to the present case.” 231
Scholars have largely assumed that the Court’s analysis
stopped at a review of the “treaty power.” 232 If so, this fact
224. Id. at 431.
225. Id. at 424.
226. Id. at 432.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 433–34.
230. Id. at 432.
231. Id. at 434–35.
232. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1885–88 (“The treaty power is somewhat analogous, textually and structurally, to the legislative power vested in the
Congress by Article I, Section I. Textually, the phrase ‘legislative Powers’ in Article I may be paraphrased as the ‘power to make laws,’ which is parallel to the
Article II ‘Power . . . to make Treaties.’ Structurally, both powers may be used to
create ‘supreme Law of the Land.’ And if the legislative power is analogous to the
treaty power, then a statute is analogous to a treaty. A statute, like a treaty, is
not itself a ‘Power[ ] vested by th[e] Constitution’; rather, like a treaty, it is the
fruit of the exercise of one such power—in this case, the legislative power vested
in the Congress by Article I, Section 1. Yet it has never been suggested that because Congress has power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the ‘legislative Powers’ of Article I, Section I, it thus
has power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
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would support the U.S. government’s authority to enter into an
international agreement imposing domestic restrictions on forest management practices on private lands. However, the
Court’s subsequent Tenth Amendment analysis, as applied to
the specific facts of Holland, makes this assertion less clear, especially when the resource in question is private forestlands. 233
For example, the Court noted that “[w]ild birds are not the possession of anyone . . . [t]he whole foundation of the State’s
rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and
in a week a thousand miles away.” 234 Thus, the migratory nature of the resource weakened the state’s claim of sole regulatory authority over them. In other words, because the MBTA involved a resource that moved across international boundaries,
Congress could enter into a treaty to regulate the resource

fruits of the exercise of such powers, which is to say, other statutes. . . . Yet this is
precisely analogous to the implicit logic of Missouri v. Holland. Justice Holmes
and the few scholars to have considered the question have implicitly assumed that
a law implementing a non-self-executing treaty that has already been made would
somehow fit the bill as a ‘Law[ ] which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution . . . [the] Power . . . to make Treaties.’ The error stems, perhaps,
from a failure to quote the relevant clauses. Or perhaps it stems from the coincidental echo of the word ‘execution’ in the Necessary and Proper Clause and in the
doctrine of non-self-executing treaties. At any rate, as noted at the outset of this
Article, Justice Holmes contented himself with just a single conclusory sentence:
‘If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government.’ ”) (alterations in original) (quoting various authorities).
233. Importantly, the Court stated:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could . . . .
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. In addition, it is unclear that the Court today even
would consider the facts of Holland under the treaty-making power: “[S]ince 1937
the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the Commerce Clause as a source of congressional power has led to more reliance upon it to uphold federal regulation of
wildlife.” GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 178 (6th ed. 2007). In fact, the MBTA itself subsequently was justified independently under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979). An assessment of whether the federal government could regulate forests
pursuant to Commerce Clause authority is outside the scope of this Article.
Though Gonzales v. Raich potentially “suggests that Lopez and Morrison did not
entirely supplant the Court’s earlier view of a broad commerce power,” Hollis, supra note 19, at 1359, it does not prove that new federalism will be eroded significantly in the near future.
234. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
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without violating the “general terms of the Tenth Amendment.” 235
The Court also invoked the national interest at stake as
support for finding no Tenth Amendment restraint on the federal government’s legislative authority:
Here a national interest of very nearly first magnitude is
involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject matter is only
transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat
therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might
be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by
while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely
upon the States. The reliance is in vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden
to act. 236

It is unclear whether it is “sufficient to rely upon the
States” to regulate forest management properly. 237 On the
other hand, it does seem clear that climate change is a “national interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” which can be
addressed only “by national action in concert with that of
another power.” 238 As noted, however, the Court in Holland
primarily relied on the migratory nature of the birds and the
235. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 360.
236. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
237. Indeed, state governments are likely to exercise less stringent environmental controls over forest management activities on state-owned and private forests than those the federal government exercises over federal forests. Scholars
have noted that “federal officials consistently exhibit greater levels of ecosystemlevel management, rare species identification and protection, ecosystem research
and monitoring, and soil and watershed improvement” than do state officials, and
“agency officials at higher levels of government are likely to favor goals other than
economic development more than are agency officials at lower levels of governance.” TOMAS M. KOONTZ, FEDERALISM IN THE FOREST: NATIONAL VERSUS
STATE NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY 77–78 (2002). Indeed, in the United States,
most states maintain forest management standards based on voluntary best management practices, rather than prescriptive regulation. Rose with MacCleery et
al., supra note 4, at 238. This leaves federal regulation of endangered species and
water quality under the ESA and CWA as the only check on private forest management activities. In other words, “[a]ll private forests are governed by laws relating to the protection of water quality, wetlands and endangered species; but
private forest owners’ objectives guide management for other values.” Id.
238. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. This statement arguably does not apply, however, regarding forest management in isolation from the climate issue. It seems
clear that the United States could manage its forests responsibly and sustainably
without reliance on the cooperation of any other nation.
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lack of “possession” by any party. Furthermore, there is no
question that the federal government historically has regulated
wildlife, so that general invocation of the Tenth Amendment by
states in Holland could not overcome the federal government’s
treaty authority to regulate that particular resource. 239 This is
a very different scenario from private forest management,
which, as discussed above, traditionally has been considered a
“land use” regulatory responsibility reserved to states. Forests
are indeed “in [the] possession” of specific public and private
landowners and are obviously not migratory.
Additionally, the history of state control over private forest
management (and land use generally) demonstrates that the
federal government customarily has not been considered a necessary party to private forest management—and forests are
not “protected only by national action in concert with that of
another power”—even if the federal government is a necessary
party to climate change negotiations. These facts, coupled with
the reassertion of federalism protections by the Court, may argue against the domestic validity of an international treaty regulating private forest management and for the invocation of a
Tenth Amendment power reserved to the states, and they could
prohibit a Holland-type ruling on challenges to an international forest management treaty.
In fact, Professor Edward Swaine, noting Justice Holmes’s
reliance in Holland on the national interest at stake, the need
for international cooperation, and the inability of states to regulate the resource in their own right, asserted that “Holland .
. . instances an interpretative presumption for the treaty power—we should prefer interpretations permitting U.S. federalism to be reconciled with the national government’s ability to
negotiate and adhere to treaties—based on the insight that the
state-based alternative to the treaty power is inadequate.” 240
In the case of forest management, it is politically arguable, but
legally unclear, that the state-based alternative is inadequate—especially considered in light of the new federalism. 241
The Court reasserted federalism protections in Lopez and Morrison in part because the Court “perceived that dual federalism
239. In Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 992–
93 (D. Haw. 1979), the court characterized the holding in Holland as the authority
of “the federal government [to] preempt state control over wildlife under federal
legislation implementing a . . . [t]reaty” (emphasis added).
240. Swaine, supra note 2, at 479.
241. See supra note 237.

418

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

required that some matters be left to the states—and, implicitly but unmistakably, that the states were capable of regulating
the matters in question.” 242 Thus the Court indicated that
“traditional exercise of state authority . . . was worth respecting
not only for tradition’s sake, but also because it demonstrated
that the states could take over precisely where the national
government was forced to stop.” 243
Ultimately, a reading of Holland that comports with the
nationalist view of the treaty power may, as noted by Professor
Rosenkranz, “run[] counter to the textual and structural logic
of the Constitution” and could result in Congress’s legislative
power being “expandable virtually without limit.” 244 Rosenkranz finds such a scenario “in deep tension with the basic constitutional scheme of enumerated legislative powers, and it
stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that the
powers of Congress are fixed and defined.” 245 Such an expansion of Congress’s legislative power is not, Rosenkranz argues,
“consistent with the text of the Constitution or with its underlying theory of separation of powers.” 246 Rosenkranz is especially critical of the Holland Court’s failure to cite a particularly germane 1836 Supreme Court decision—Mayor of New
Orleans v. United States—recognizing the principle that “the
government of the United States . . . is one of limited powers.
It can exercise authority over no subjects, except those which
have been delegated to it. Congress cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the
treaty-making power.” 247 As demonstrated in the next section,
New Orleans is all the more relevant to an analysis of any treaty regulating land uses like forest management, as the treaty
242. Swaine, supra note 2, at 479.
243. Id.
244. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1893.
245. Id. at 1894. Rosenkranz continued:
Just recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that “Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.” But it was
Chief Justice Marshall, almost two centuries before, who explained why
in the clearest terms: “enumeration presupposes something not enumerated,” or more emphatically, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined,
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608
(2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
246. Id. at 1899.
247. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836).
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at issue in that case sought to impede traditional state control
over property rights.
The Holland Court’s Tenth Amendment analysis may be
limited to the specific fact pattern of Holland, resting upon the
Court’s characterization of the birds as being wildlife of a migratory nature and the necessity of countries collaborating for
the management of transboundary resources. Scholars have
asserted as much, with Bradley noting that “although Holland
has been construed as giving the treaty power complete immunity from federalism limitations, the decision itself can be
read much more narrowly,” 248 and Swaine arguing that “there
is a substantial risk that subject-matter limitations . . . [may
be] applied to the exercise of the treaty power. While Missouri
v. Holland may survive for the foreseeable future, it will likely
be read narrowly.” 249 Or, as summarized by Kuh:
[T]he expansive, nationalist view of the treaty power is unlikely to survive sustained analysis intact and will likely be
cabined by some type of limiting principle. When presented
with arguments that the treaty power justifies congressional power to act in an area outside of the bounds of the
Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers, the Supreme Court will be forced to reexamine in a serious way,
for the first time in nearly eighty years, an ill-defined, poorly understood constitutional doctrine (the nationalist view),
the wholesale adoption of which could easily be argued to
undermine the concept of enumerated powers so recently
embraced by the Court in its Commerce Clause, Eleventh
Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and anti-commandeering
decisions. It only seems prudent to anticipate that instead
of feeling inexorably bound by relatively moribund
precedent, the Court will instead endeavor to assimilate the
treaty power into the revived federalism that it has put forward with such frequency. 250

Rosenkranz is even more direct, stating that “Missouri v.
Holland may be canonical, but it does not present a strong case
for the application of stare decisis. It is wrongly decided, and it
should be overruled.” 251
Not every scholar who asserts likely federalism limits on
the treaty power believes such limits will arise out of the judi248.
249.
250.
251.

Bradley I, supra note 19, at 459.
Swaine, supra note 2, at 412.
Fischer, supra note 19, at 186.
Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1937.
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ciary. Hollis, for instance, does not believe that the Supreme
Court will revisit Holland anytime soon. 252 Although agreeing
that federalism restraints likely will be placed on the treaty
power, Hollis asserted that these limitations will arise out of
the executive branch, rather than the judiciary. 253 Hollis
claimed that both nationalists and new federalists are fixated
misguidedly on Holland—nationalists believing Holland
rightly held there were no federalism restraints on the treaty
power, and new federalists seeking to justify overturning Holland or “dramatically restricting its scope.” 254 Hollis cited various rationales supporting his conclusion, 255 but his primary
rationale was that the executive’s protection of federalism principles may prevent the Court from ever having a chance to revisit Holland. 256 Hollis noted that
[t]he executive, in exercising its Article II power, has consistently held the reins on accepting U.S. treaty obligations[;]
. . . it is ultimately the executive that negotiates and concludes U.S. treaties and determines the scope of the obligations it wishes to assume. Thus, it is the executive’s choice,
first and foremost, whether to defer to federalism in treatymaking. Of late, it has done so with increasing frequency.
As such, the Court may never have a chance to revisit Missouri. The treaties the president concludes today simply do
not implicate the legal authority questions Holmes had to
address. 257

Hollis argued that the executive has adopted at least six distinct approaches to federalism during treaty-making: (1) no ac252. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1360.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1344–45.
255. Hollis’s first rationale was that a majority of the current Court actually
supported Holland, as Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens, Thomas, and Souter all
accept Holland as good law. Id. at 1353–54. Hollis’s second rationale is that the
Court resists judicial review of the treaty power, since the Supreme Court has
never struck down a treaty for exceeding the scope of the treaty power. Hollis
noted that “it would require a dramatic change for the Court to suddenly begin
policing limits on the treaty power.” Id. at 1355. If any subject were “dramatic”
enough to prompt the Court to address the scope of the treaty power, however, it
would be property rights. Given the fundamental and controversial nature of private property rights, federal regulation of private property via a forest treaty
might give rise to Fifth Amendment takings claims, which are considered relatively often by the Supreme Court. Hollis further cited renewed deference to foreign
affairs power and broader conceptions of Congress’s legislative power as reasons
the Court is unlikely to revisit Holland. Id. at 1352–53.
256. Id. at 1360.
257. Id.
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commodation at all (either when federalism is not an issue or
on matters involving foreign persons or transnational conduct), 258 (2) rejecting the treaty, 259 (3) modifying the treaty to
account for federalism, 260 (4) modifying U.S. consent to the
treaty, 261 (5) limiting federal implementation of the treaty,262
and (6) limiting federal enforcement of the treaty. 263
Hollis observed that the executive increasingly has implemented federalism restraints during U.S. treaty-making, and
has “limited treaties from expanding federal law-making
beyond Congress’s legislative powers or interfering with activities traditionally regulated by the states.” 264 Hollis agreed
with other scholars 265 that federalism’s potential restraining
effect on the treaty power may limit the United States’ ability
to engage successfully in treaty-making, noting that Executive
Federalism
may prevent the United States from joining treaties it
might otherwise have an interest in joining. It may restrain
the United States from obtaining concessions from other nations with regard to their behavior because of the knowledge
that the United States would not be able to reciprocate given states’ rights concerns. 266

258. Id. at 1371–72.
259. Examples include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, see supra
note 137 (because of its focus on issues that were exclusively the purview of the
state), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1372–73.
260. For example, Hollis noted that the Tobacco Convention originally would
have required the federal government to force states to promote measures to protect the public from the harms of tobacco smoke, but due to federalism concerns it
ultimately only imposed those requirements on the federal government “in areas
of existing national jurisdiction as determined by national law” while “actively
promot[ing it] at other jurisdictional levels.” Hollis, supra note 19, at 1377. Similarly, the Council of European Corruption Convention implicated state criminal
law, but the executive negotiated explanatory language providing that “it was the
intention of the drafters of the Convention that [c]ontracting parties assume obligations under this Convention only to the extent consistent with their
[c]onstitution and the fundamental principles of their legal system, including,
where appropriate, the principles of federalism.” Id. at 1378 (alterations in original).
261. Id. at 1378–81.
262. Id. at 1382–84.
263. Id. at 1384–86.
264. Id. at 1363.
265. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
266. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1394–95.
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Importantly, Hollis concluded that “even if the Court somehow
reengages the issue, Executive Federalism offers evidence of
treaty power limits from the power-holder’s perspective—limits
to which the Court is likely to defer.” 267
Ultimately, regardless of whether the judiciary narrows or
overrules Holland, or the executive places its own federalism
restraints on the treaty power, the potential complications for a
forest treaty that fails to take into account U.S. federalism are
significant. The next section concludes this review of federalism and the treaty power by demonstrating that even the nationalist view, as put forth by Golove, may allow for federalism
restraints on the treaty power in the area of land use activities
and property rights, such as those at issue in forest management activities—creating even more uncertainty and further
supporting a global treaty that incorporates voluntary mechanisms for forest management, rather than prescriptive mandates.
C.

The Treaty Power and Private Property Rights

[N]either life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular
right of any state, can be affected by a treaty.
—Edmond Randolph 268

The treaty power’s relationship with private property
rights provides yet another example of the uncertainty surrounding the treaty power’s scope and federalism’s potential
limits upon it. Even under the broad, nationalist reading of
Holland, direct regulation of private property rights and land
use activities, like forest management, may be outside the
scope of the treaty power. Both Bradley and Golove, though on
opposite ends of the debate, have indicated as much, and federalism-based protection of private property rights from an encroaching treaty power has deep historical roots. Bradley cited
an 1819 opinion of the Attorney General that suggested a limitation on the treaty power in the area of private property
rights. 269 The opinion stated that “the federal government
could not alter by treaty state inheritance law concerning real
267. Id. at 1386.
268. The Debates in The Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, reprinted in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).
269. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 275 (1819).
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property.” 270 Similarly, in Mayor of New Orleans v. United
States, the issue was whether, pursuant to a treaty with
France, the federal government had acquired trust rights over
certain properties in the City of New Orleans, or whether those
property rights remained in the local government. 271 The
Court ruled in favor of the city, finding, as noted above, that
the federal government “is one of limited powers,” and its power cannot be “enlarged under the treaty-making power,” thus
suggesting a federalism limitation on the treaty power in the
area of property rights. 272
Furthermore, it was not only the judicial branch of government that asserted federalism limitations on the treaty
power in the area of property rights. Ralston Hayden, an early
twentieth-century scholar who wrote extensively on the treaty
power and states’ rights, noted that between 1830 and 1860
“the Senate and the executive entertained grave and increasing
doubts concerning their authority to make treaties” in the area
of real property rights and that “in every particular instance in
which conflict arose the treaty in question was amended to
bring it more nearly into accord with the states’ rights
theory.” 273
Though Golove’s analysis of property rights as a states’
rights limit on the treaty power is rather disjointed, upon closer review it arguably supports federalism as a restraint on the
treaty power in the area of property rights. Golove consistently
cited treaties the United States entered into that limited state
authority over property rights as foolproof examples of how the
treaty power can trump powers traditionally left to the
states. 274 Yet Golove’s examples may not prove as much as he
would prefer. Every example Golove cited dealt with property
owned by foreign nationals. For example, Golove asked “[c]an
the federal government enter into treaties on subjects that are
otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers? Consider
some typical examples from the nation’s past: treaty stipula270. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 416.
271. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
272. Id. at 736.
273. Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 566, 585 (1917). In turn, Bradley notes, Hayden “explains
that, when President Fillmore submitted a proposed treaty between the United
States and Switzerland to the Senate in 1850, he asked for and obtained amendments from the Senate to protect the reserved powers of the States.” Bradley I,
supra note 19, at 421 (citing Hayden, supra, at 575–76).
274. See generally Golove, supra note 21; Hollis, supra note 19.
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tions overriding traditional state laws preventing aliens from
owning real property . . . .” 275 Golove cited another treaty that
allowed citizens of the United States and citizens of France to
“own real and personal property in the territory of the other
and dispose of it by testament, donation, or otherwise to whomsoever they chose. This stipulation altered the traditional
common law rule of the states, which denied aliens the right to
own real property.” 276 Noting the “close relationship between
real property and state sovereignty,” Golove asserted that “the
provision was bound to raise questions about the scope of the
treaty power” and that “this provision, found in the very first
treaty of the new nation and repeated in countless treaties thereafter, raised the single issue over which the states’ rights and
nationalist views of the treaty power would most recurrently
contend for the next century and a half” 277—that is, the treaty
power versus state control over property rights of citizens of
other nations.
Indeed, Golove spent a remarkable amount of time discussing various treaties that trumped state regulatory authority
over property rights—but in each case, the treaty only trumped
state property rights authority as it related to aliens owning
property in the United States. A treaty power scope that subsumes traditional state authority over property only in the narrow circumstances of foreign citizens’ ownership rights is hardly surprising, as it is consistent with Holland’s focus on treaty
subject matters that necessarily implicate the involvement of
the federal government—that is, treaties that necessarily involve the participation of, or interaction with, a foreign power. 278 Given one of the primary justifications for the treaty
power—the need to speak with one voice in international affairs 279—the federal government would necessarily engage
with a foreign power over rights of foreign citizens living in the
United States and would do so constitutionally.
In fact, the Supreme Court holdings that Golove cited
make clear that the Court only upholds treaty stipulations over
traditional state authority under circumstances where the
treaties are “for the protection of citizens of one country resid-

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Golove, supra note 21, at 1077.
Id. at 1106–07.
Id. at 1107.
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003).
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ing in the territory of another” 280 or are “agreement[s] with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United
States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the United States.” 281 It may be a stretch to assert

280. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
281. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931). Golove provided other examples of treaty power trumping traditional state authority, but each instance,
again, involved foreign nationals:
The Court’s two most notable opinions in the decade following Missouri were Asakura v. City of Seattle and Santovincenzo v. Egan. At issue in Asakura was a Seattle municipal ordinance regulating pawnbrokers, which restricted applicants to citizens of the United States. It would
be hard to imagine a subject more local in character, and the city urged
the Court to revisit Missouri; the city argued that Missouri was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and rendered the treaty power “a convenient substitute for legislation in fields over which Congress has no jurisdiction. As this Court knows, a treaty is usually drafted secretly by
the State Department or commissioners . . . in conference with some foreign representative.” The Court refused the bait. Instead, Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous Court, made clear that Missouri would be
taken for all it was worth:
The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any
express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend
“so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,” it does extend
to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
other nations. . . . The treaty was made to strengthen friendly relations between the two nations. . . . Treaties for the protection of citizens of one country residing in the territory of another are numerous, and make for good understanding between nations. The treaty
is binding within the State of Washington. . . . It stands on the
same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution
and laws of the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of
any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given
authoritative effect by the courts.
In other words, the only question was whether the treaty was of a common type and whether it strengthened “friendly relations” and promoted
“good understanding.” If so, then no matter how local the subjects with
which it dealt, it fell within the scope of the treaty power and superseded
inconsistent state laws.
Santovincenzo presented a similar case. The treaty at issue had a
novel provision concerning intestate distribution of the estates of decedents of Italian nationality. Under New York law, in the absence of
known heirs, the estate escheated to the state. Under the treaty, however, the Italian Consul was entitled to receive the assets for distribution
in accordance with Italian law. Thus, rather than just removing the disability of alienage, the treaty substituted the law of a foreign nation regarding inheritance for the law of a state. The Court was once again unanimous in upholding the treaty, with Chief Justice Hughes delivering
the opinion. Reminding his audience that treaties of this kind have reciprocal benefits, Hughes observed:
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that Golove’s nationalist perspective on the treaty power would
carry the day over traditional state authority in the area of private forest management, when no foreign power or its citizens
were involved. Golove indicated as much, ultimately asserting
that “a treaty cannot . . . adopt domestic standards just because
the President and Senate believe them to be laudable. A treaty
is unconstitutional if it does not serve a foreign policy interest
or if it is concluded not to affect the conduct of other nations
but to regulate our own.” 282
Perhaps most tellingly, although Golove is one of the most
vocal proponents of the nationalist view, his ultimate analysis
actually argued against the use of the treaty power to trump
traditional state authority over property rights. Golove provided context by stating that:
[N]ationalist view proponents do not argue that the treaty
power, because it is exclusively granted to the federal government, is therefore free from federalism limitations that
would apply to concurrent powers . . . . [A]s I have also previously pointed out, they do not contend that the treaty
power is categorically exempt from either affirmative federalism limitations, such as . . . the general Tenth Amendment declaration that exercises of nondelegated authority
are unconstitutional. 283

Golove then made an analogy between separation of powers limitations and federalism limitations on the treaty power,
noting that a treaty “purporting to authorize the President rather than Congress hereafter to make laws regulating interstate and foreign commerce would violate the separation of
powers. Even though a treaty can regulate particular matters
falling within those subjects, it may not change the internal

There can be no question as to the power of the Government of the
United States to make the Treaty . . . . The treaty-making power is
broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations, and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the
nationals of such countries within the United States, and the disposition of property of aliens dying within the territory of the respective parties, is within the scope of that power, and any conflicting
law of the State must yield.
Golove, supra note 21, at 1270–72 (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341; Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 40).
282. Golove, supra note 21, at 1287–88.
283. Id. at 1285.
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distribution of power between Congress and the President.” 284
Strikingly, Golove argued that
[l]ikewise, a treaty purporting to grant Congress hereafter
legislative authority over, say, real property in the states,
would fall afoul of federalism. Although a treaty can regulate particular aspects of real property relations in the
states, it cannot transfer legislative authority over those
subjects from the states to Congress. Beyond these cases,
treaties are as subject to federalism as they are to the separation of powers. 285

Although this statement can be read merely to mean that
Congress cannot aggregate unto itself a general authority to
regulate private property directly, Golove failed to explain how
such an aggregation would be fundamentally different than allowing individual treaties to “regulate particular aspects of real
property relations.” Apparently, based upon Golove’s own lengthy summary of examples, he would confine such regulation in
the area of property rights to treaties affecting real property
owned by foreign nationals.
Ultimately, regardless of the contentious outcome of the
“new federalism” versus “nationalist” debate on the scope of the
treaty power—in the legislature, the courts, and the scholarly
literature—it appears that it is at least uncertain whether the
federal government can claim authority over private property
rights—and land use activities like forest management—in
light of potential federalism limits on the treaty power. Not only does Missouri v. Holland raise such doubts, but so do the
scholarly writings of parties on both sides of the “new federalism” vs. “nationalist” debate. If federalism does so limit the
treaty power, then the federal government would not be able to
implement prescriptive, “traditional governance” forest management directives on private lands pursuant to an international treaty. Any attempt to do so would result in Tenth
Amendment judicial challenges, likely brought by both private
landowners and state governments.

284.
285.

Id. at 1286.
Id. (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
The international community is properly increasing its focus on global forest management in the battle against climate
change and is rightly taking an interest in forest management
activities on a local scale. This focus is essential to capture the
full carbon sequestration value of the world’s forests, as well as
to preserve the numerous other ecosystem services provided by
sustainable forestry. Achieving either a binding, stand-alone
forest treaty or a climate treaty incorporating forest management, however, will depend in large part on the United States’
willingness and ability to enter into and implement such a
treaty. U.S. federalism complicates the United States’ role in
the formation of any treaty aimed at forests, since the federal
government is granted authority under the Constitution to negotiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary
regulatory authority over land use activities like forest management.
The United States has a history of invoking federalism to
inhibit treaty formation and implementation, and constitutional law scholars continue to debate whether federalism may act
as a limit on the treaty power. The uncertainty regarding federalism’s effect on the treaty power is compounded upon closer
review of Missouri v. Holland, as the precedential value it
holds for potential challenges to a future treaty aimed at forest
management is unclear. A review of the relationship between
the treaty power and private property rights further demonstrates that the extent to which the federal government may
invoke the treaty power to regulate in the area of traditionally
state-regulated land use activities is questionable, and the outer bounds of the federal government’s treaty power authority
are ill-defined at best.
In contrast, there is greater certainty regarding which mechanisms might be best employed to coordinate international
forest management activities, as the increased global focus on
bottom-up market-based mechanisms demonstrates. Combining the uncertain with the “more certain,” it is apparent that at
the current time the international community should avoid a
global forest treaty based upon “traditional governance” and
prescriptive mandates that may run afoul of federalism principles in the United States. Market-based initiatives like
REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction
programs would provide the best opportunity to achieve global
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forest management goals and would do so with the uncompromised leadership and participation of the United States. The
United States’ cooperation is crucial if the international community is ever to convince the Alabama forester to leave the
oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines on the creek bank and provide essential environmental benefits not only to rural Alabama, but to the world.

